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Natural Philosophy and Politics 

in the Leibniz-Clarke Disputes 

By Steven Shapin* 
A
FTER TWO AND A  HALF CENTURIES the Newton-Leibniz  disputes 
continue to inflame the passions. Only the very learned (or the very fool- 
hardy) dare to enter upon this great killing-ground of the history of ideas. Recent 
intense concern with these controversies means that we can no longer reasonably 
expect the discovery of  significant new facts. The emphasis has shifted to inter- 
preting what is already known about these episodes and the setting in which they 
occurred.  This  is  a  highly  desirable state of  affairs,  for  the Newton-Leibniz 
controversies  crystallize  a  number  of  issues  of  general  significance.  What  is 
the proper interpretation of  the relations  between  natural philosophy,  mathe- 
matics, metaphysics, theology, and the social and political setting in which these 
matters were disputed? 
The elementary anatomy of  the controversies  is  well  known.  From the late 
1690s until about 1714 the stress was upon priority in  the discovery of  the cal- 
culus. Did Leibniz, as Newton and his disciples charged, obtain from Newton the 
secrets of the calculus in the 1670s? And did Leibniz then obscure this debt while 
representing his own work as totally independent and original? From about 1710 
the disputes began to involve questions in natural philosophy, metaphysics, and 
religion. These issues reached their greatest prominence during 1715 and 1716, 
when Leibniz exchanged a series of five letters with the Reverend Samuel Clarke 
concerning metaphysics,  natural religion,  God's  role in  the natural order, the 
nature of space, matter, and force, and the status of  mathematical principles in 
natural philosophy. Finally, the disputes continued after Leibniz's death in 1716 
(and even after Newton's  in  1727), developing into a largely experimental and 
theoretical confrontation between their respective followers over the nature of 
force in physical inquiries.' 
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'The definitive account of the mathematical priority disputes is now A. Rupert Hall, Philosophers 
at War: The Quarrel between Newton and  Leibniz  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,  1980); see 
also the diagrammatic chart in A. Rupert Hall and Laura Tilling, eds., The Correspondence of Isaac 
Newton, Vol. VI (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press,  1976), p. xxviii. On the 1720s debates con- 
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and Social Psychology,"  British Journal for  the History of Science,  1973, 6:343-377;  Iltis, "Leibniz 
and the Vis Viva Controversy," Isis, 1971,62:21-35;  Thomas Hankins, "Eighteenth Century Attempts 
to Resolve the Vis Viva Controversy," Isis, 1965,56:281-297.  The classic treatments of the Leibniz- 
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The most  challenging  historiographic  problems  are posed  by  the  Leibniz- 
Clarke exchanges and related episodes, with their explicit conjunction of  natural 
philosophy,  metaphysics,  and  theology.  Practically  every  historian  who  has 
addressed these materials has signified in  some way where he felt appropriate 
boundaries  should  be  drawn  between  different  areas  of  culture.  Where  the 
boundaries are placed is reflected in the interpretation each historian offers. Few 
modern writers follow the old positivist inclination to set interpretive boundaries 
between "science  proper"  on the one hand and metaphysics and theology on the 
other.'  Most follow Koyre in demonstrating how metaphysics, theological con- 
siderations, and natural philosophy fit into one interacting system of  meaning^.^ 
Yet even Koyre's contextualism has its limits; no writer in his tradition has seen 
any point in paying attention to the social and political settings within which the 
disputes o~curred.~ 
A consideration of  the political setting is essential to a proper appreciation of 
the significance of  metaphysical,  theological,  and natural-philosophical  dispu- 
tation in  the Leibniz-Clarke controversies. The key notion involved in demon- 
strating that relevance is the use of philosophical resources in political processes. 
Different conceptions of  God's role in the natural order were used to advance or 
criticize different notions of  the state and the distribution  of  authority. These 
conflicting conceptions were sustained by groups with conflicting social interests 
in  the political  constitution of  late  seventeenth- and  early eighteenth-century 
England.s Natural philosophers evaluated conceptions of God and nature in light 
of their present and past apologetic uses.6 Specifically, the English Newtonians' 
and the History of Philosophy (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952), pp. 168-191;  Alexandre 
Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1957), 
pp. 235-272;  F. E.  L. Priestley, "The Clarke-Leibniz Controversy," in Robert E.  Butts and John W. 
Davis,  eds.  The Methodological  Heritage  of  Newton  (Toronto:  Univ.  Toronto  Press,  1970), 
pp. 34-56;  Robert Zimmerrnann, Sam~tel  Clarke's Leben und Lehre (Vienna: Imperial Academy of 
Sciences, 1870), pp. 52-78;  G. H. R. Parkinson, "Science and Metaphysics in the Leibniz-Newton 
Controversy,"  Studia Leibnitiana (Supplernenta), 1969, 2:79-  112. 
:For  an example  of  such positivism:  Margula  R. Perl,  "Physics  and  Metaphysics  in Newton, 
Leibniz, and Clarke,"  Journal of the History  of Ideas,  1969, 30:507-526,  esp. p. 526; cf.  E. W. 
Strong, "Newton  and God," J. Hist.  Ideas,  1952, 13:147-167. 
'Some  recent writers have constructed a boundary between the metaphysical and the other aspects 
of  the controversies. To Frank Manuel the metaphysical issues were a "sideshow,"  the main event 
being  the calculus  priority  disputes  between  Leibniz  and  a  man  "with  an internalized God the 
Father."  Manuel, A  Portrait  of Isauc  Newton  (Washington: New Republic Books,  1979; 1st ed., 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,  1968), p. 333. Rupert Hall's historiographic  boundary is 
explicitly evaluative; the extension of the calculus priority contest to natural philosophical and meta- 
physical issues was a "regrettable and largely pointless diversification":  Hall, Philosophers at War, 
p. 192. 
"A published  account  that accords a significant role to political factors (but does not consider 
intellectual content) is Arnold Thackray, "'The  Business of  Experimental Philosophy':  The Early 
Newtonian Group at the Royal Society," Actes du XIIe CongrPs International d'Histoire des Sciences, 
1970-1971,  3B:lSS-159.  Not available while  this paper was  being  written  were  Larry  Stewart, 
"Samuel  Clarke, Newtonianism, and the Factions of Post-Revolutionary England,"  J. Hist. Ideas, 
1981, 42:53-72,  and Simon Schaffer, "Newtonian Cosmology and the Steady State"  (Ph.D. diss., 
Univ. Cambridge,  1980). Both offer valuable  political perspectives on these episodes, particularly 
Schaffer,  whose  account  is  broadly  and  gratifyingly  similar  to mine  and  contains much  greater 
historical detail. 
'The term "England"  is used throughout even though after 1707 the relevant polity was "Great 
Britain." 
'For  a fuller exposition of  this view of  the social uses of  natural knowledge see Steven Shapin, 
"Social  Uses of  Science,"  in George Rousseau and Roy Porter, eds., The Ferment of Knowledge: 
Studies in the Historiography  of Eighteenth-Century  Science  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 
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reaction to Leibniz's philosophy was shaped by their vested interest in combatting 
indigenous forms of  anti-Newtonian thought which  politically  opposed groups 
had used  as apologetic resources.  Leibniz's philosophy was perceived to share 
crucially important characteristics with that of  the English anti-Newtonian polit- 
ical opposition. 
In order to make this interpretation plausible one has to show that Newtonian 
and anti-Newtonian  conceptions were actually  used  as political  tools by  social 
groups. The focus here, therefore, is upon identifying  these groups and their 
interests and not, as is often the case in studies of these disputes, upon diagnosing 
the motivations or states of  mind of  individual actors. Whether or not Newton. 
for example, intended that his philosophy of  nature should be put to specific 
political uses is an interesting question, but it is not our question here, nor need it 
be.'  What do concern us are the historically demonstrable uses to which New- 
tonian and anti-Newtonian philosophies actually were put, and the social interests 
served by those uses. In this exercise the historian is in roughly the same position 
as his historical subjects, for, like them, he has unambiguous access only to visible 
cultural products and not to the intentions of those who produced them.8 
THE DYNASTIC CONTEXT OF THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE EXCHANGES 
As Arnold Thackray  has briefly  noted, the disputes between Leibniz and the 
Newtonians were enmeshed with the dynastic politics of England and the house 
of Hano~er.~  The location of the two major philosophers in this dynastic setting 
gives us an entry into assessing the social interests served by conflicting philos- 
ophies of nature and God. From the 1670s Leibniz was on the personal staff of 
Johann Friedrich, duke of Brunswick-Liineberg, at Hanover, where he acted as 
librarian, technological advisor, and councilor at court. When the old duke died 
in  1679 and was succeeded by Ernst August, Leibniz became philosophical tutor 
to the duchess  Sophia. Through his  genealogical researches  on the house of 
Brunswick Leibniz was instrumental in securing electoral status for Hanover in 
the Holy Roman Empire. Leibniz himself became privy councilor and later baron 
of  the Empire. Slighted by  Elector Georg Ludwig  from  1698, Leibniz busied 
himself with completing his genealogical work and undertook religious, legal, and 
political reform at the Hapsburg court in Vienna, where he served from 1712 to 
'Historians  are still not agreed about Newton's  apologetic intentions. Some have made much of 
Newton's  celebrated  letters to Bentley in which  he  said: "When  I wrote my  Treatise about our 
System [the Principial, I had an Eye upon such Principles as might work with considering Men, for the 
Belief of a Deity, and nothing can rejoice me more than to find it useful for that Purpose." I. Bernard 
Cohen, ed., Isaac Newton's Papers & Letters on Natural Philosophy, and Related  Documents (2nd 
ed.. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1978). p. 280. With regard to Newton's possible role in 
the Leibniz-Clarke letters, one point of view has been that Clarke functioned as Newton's  mouth- 
piece: Alexandre Koyre and I. Bernard Cohen, "Newton  & the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence," 
Archives internationales d'histoire des sciences, 1962, 5:63-126,  esp. p. 66; see also KoyrC, From the 
Closed  World, p. 301; Manuel, Portrait  of  Isaac Newton, p. 278; Alexandre Koyre and I. Bernard 
Cohen, "The  Case of  the Missing  Tanquam: Leibniz, Newton  Rr  Clarke,"  Isis,  1961, 52:555-566, 
esp. p. 560; A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, "Clarke  and Newton,"  Isis,  1961, 52:583-585. 
Elsewhere Hall has contended  that  Newton's  role  was  probably  minimal: Hall and Tilling,  The 
Correspondence of Newton, Vol. VI, pp. xxix-xxx;  Hall, Philosophers at War, pp. 220, 328 n. 23. 
some general problems involved in discerning motives and employing this information  see 
Steven Shapin and Barry Barnes, "Darwin and Social Darwinism: Purity and History," in Barnes and 
Shapin, eds., Natural  Order: Historical Studies of  Scientific Culture (London/Beverly Hills, Calif.: 
Sage, 1979), pp. 125-142. 
'Thackray,  "'The Business of Experimental Philosophy.' " 190  STEVEN  SHAPIN 
1714 as imperial privy  councilor.  In 1714 Georg Ludwig  became  George I of 
England. Leibniz bent his efforts towards securing the post of court historian in 
London, but he failed and was forced to remain in Hanover until he died in 1716. 
The English court maintained no salaried philosopher,  but in  many respects 
Newton was treated by his contemporaries as its "official"  scientific intellectual. 
Lucasian professor of  mathematics at Cambridge from 1669, Newton served as 
one of  the university's two members in the first post-Revolution Parliament and 
was reelected in  1701. Leaving Cambridge, he was made Warden (later Master) 
of  the Mint by the patronage of  the Whig politician Lord Montague. From the 
accession of Queen Anne until the death of  George I Newton was undoubtedly 
the most influential figure in  the official scientific,  philosophical, and techno- 
logical affairs of the nation; there is no question but that he was so perceived by 
others. He was elected president of the Royal Society in 1703 and knighted by the 
queen in 1705. His newly edited and published correspondence reveals just  how 
significant Newton was  as an advisor to the crown, in charge of  consulting on 
mining,  navigational, and astronomical  matters. He was  assiduous in  securing 
positions of power and influence for many of  his followers and just as diligent in 
rooting out and pursuing those who crossed him. Moreover, he gave active and 
substantial advice to a number of  Anglican divines whose Boyle lectures from 
1692  developed  Newtonian  natural  philosophy  into  an  important  apologetic 
resource for the church and its interests. 
Among these Boyle lecturers was  Samuel Clarke (1675-1729),  a fellow of 
Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge, from 1696 until 1700.1° In 1697 Clarke 
translated Rohault's Physics into more elegant Latin, adding anti-Cartesian and 
pro-Newtonian notes to the edition, and in  1706 he performed Newton a greater 
literary service by translating the Opticks into Latin. In 1698 Clarke succeeded 
William  Whiston  as chaplain  to Dr. John Moore,  bishop  of  Norwich.  After 
hearing  his Boyle lectures in  1704-1705,  the queen made Clarke one of  her 
chaplains,  and  in  1709 he  was  awarded  the  rectorship  of  St. James's,  West- 
minster.  It is  possible  that Clarke was  offered, and declined, the position  of 
Master of the Mint upon Newton's death.  ' ' Like Newton's his political principles 
were strongly Whiggish;  in  theological  affairs  he  was  a propagandist  for  the 
latitudinarian Low Church faction. His Boyle lectures followed Richard Bent- 
ley's  in erecting Newtonianism  into one of  the moral bulwarks of  Christianity, 
while  the  exchanges  with  Leibniz  defended  Newtonian  natural  religion  from 
perceived  threats.I2 Caroline, princess of  Wales, wife of  the future George 11, 
presided over and to a large extent initiated the formal interchanges between 
Clarke and  Leibniz.  In  her  youth  at the  court of  Berlin  Caroline had  been 
Leibniz's pupil while the philosopher was also instructing Sophia Charlotte, wife 
to Frederick  I  of  Prussia.  In  1705 Caroline  married  the  electoral prince  of 
IUFor  biographical information about Clarke see Benjamin Hoadly, "Some Account of  the Life, 
Writings, and  Character of  [Samuel Clarke]," in John Clarke, ed., The Works of  Samuel Clarke, 4 
vols. (London, 1738), Vol. I, pp.  i-xiv;  William Whiston, Historical A4emoirs of  the Life of  Dr. 
Samuel  Clarke  (London, 1730); Joel  M. Rodney, "Samuel  Clarke,"  in  Dictionary  of  Scientific 
Biography, Vol. 111, pp.  294-297;  James Edward  Le Rossignol, The Ethical Philosophy of Samuel 
Clarke (Leipzig: G.  Kreysing, 1892). 
"The Dictionary  of  National  Biography  makes this claim, denied by Hall, Philosophers at  War, 
p.  328; Rodney, "Samuel Clarke," recounts a story that Caroline was considering having him made 
archbishop of  Canterbury. 
"On the Boyle  lectures in  general, see  Margaret  C. Jacob, The Newtonians  and  the  English 
Revolution 1689-1720  (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1976), Chs. V-VI. 191  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
Hanover and continued her association with Leibniz. Removing to London with 
the house of  Hanover in  1714, Caroline commenced her contacts with  Clarke 
during her efforts to find a suitable translator of Leibniz's 1710 The'odice'e. Clarke 
became  a  constant  visitor  at court,  attempting  to persuade  Caroline  of  the 
superiority of Newton's philosophy and almost supplanting Leibniz as her philo- 
sophical mentor. '' 
The letters passing  between  Caroline  and Leibniz point  to his  desperation 
about his increasingly isolated and unsatisfactory position at Hanover, his unease 
at the Newtonians' growing influence over his royal pupil, and his frustration over 
his inability to secure an official position at the English court. Conversely, the 
Newtonian establishment's concerted effort to discredit Leibniz's mathematical 
originality dates from the time that the Act of Settlement made it certain that the 
house of Hanover, with Leibniz as its court philosopher, would be the next royal 
house of England.  l4 The disputes were seen by participants in nationalistic terms. 
A friend of Leibniz told him that the controversies were being widely regarded 
not as a "querelle  entre Mr Newton et moy, mais entre 17Allemagne  et 17Angle- 
terre. . . ." And after the Hanoverian succession took place, John Keill assured 
Newton that "Mr. Leibnits after this will not have the impudence to show his face 
in England. if  he does I am persuaded that he will find but few freinds."I5 But 
Keill was putting on a brave face. Leibniz would indeed have been a formidable 
foe had he been invited to London by his Hanoverian patrons. For intertwined 
with the dynastic politics of Hanover and England were domestic English eccle- 
siastical, political, and ideological conflicts. By considering these domestic dis- 
putes we shall see one of the reasons why Leibniz's philosophy was regarded as so 
threatening and why the English Newtonians were so concerned to crush it. 
WILL VERSUS WISDOM IN THE LEIBNIZIAN AND NEWTONIAN PHILOSOPHIES 
In Samuel Clarke's dedication to Princess Caroline of the 1717 publication of his 
exchanges with Leibniz he states that natural philosophy,  "so  far as it affects 
religion,  by determining questions concerning liberty and fate, concerning the 
extent of  the powers of matter and motion, and the proofs from phenomena of 
God's continual government of the world; is of very great imp~rtance."'~  In the 
early eighteenth-century apologetic setting this bordered on the banal, for it was 
absolutely standard to infer God's capacities from the constitution of nature and 
to interpret natural phenomena from the known attributes of  the Deity. What 
l3 "Introduction,"  The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,  ed. H. G. Alexander (Manchester: Man- 
chester Univ. Press,  1956), pp. ix-lvi,  on p. xii. 
I4Thackray, "'The Business of Experimental Philosophy,'" p. 156; Hall, Philosophers at War, esp. 
pp. 118-119,  130-132,  159, 164, 177. Hall, unlike Thackray, makes no explicit connection between 
the disputes and dynastic politics. 
"Leibniz  to the  Princess  of  Wales,  10 May  1715, in  John M. Kemble, ed., State Papers  and 
Correspondence Illustrative of  the Social and  Political  State  of  Europe from  the Revolution  to the 
Accession of the House of Hanover (London: John W. Parker, 1857), pp. 528-531,  on p. 529; Keill to 
Newton, 6 Aug. 1714, in Correspondence of  Newton, Vol. VI, pp. 170-171.  After Leibniz's death 
Newton disclaimed any nationalistic interest in the disputes: Newton to Johann Bernoulli, c. 1720, in 
A. Rupert Hall and Laura Tilling, eds., The Correspondence of Isaac Newton, Vol. VII (Cambridge: 
Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), pp. 80-81,  although elsewhere there is abundant evidence that the 
national and dynastic dimensions were recognized:  see, e.g., Johann Bernoulli  to Leibniz, 3 July 
1716, in  Correspondence of  Newton,  Vol. VI, pp. 359-362;  Newton  to Antonio-Schinella  Conti, 
26 Feb. 1716, in ibid., pp. 285-290,  on p. 285. 
l6 Leibniz-Clarke  Correspondence, p. 6. 192  STEVEN SHAPIN 
writers in this setting shared were the patterns of  inference which meaningfully 
connected God and nature. What they disagreed about (usually violently) was the 
set of axioms laid down concerning the nature of God and the nature of nature. 
This should not surprise us, for what was at stake was as much moral philosophy 
as natural philosophy. Upon God's attributes and his relationship to the natural 
order depended a set of  ethical prescriptions  about  how  one was  to conduct 
oneself on earth. This clash of theological axioms (and its practical consequences) 
is particularly evident in the Leibniz-Clarke exchanges. There is little novelty in 
noting that these disputes were given their basic structure by conflicting apprecia- 
tions of God's attributes and his relations with the natural order. The Newtonian 
schema  stressed  God's  voluntary  capacities,  while  the Leibnizian  cosmology 
emphasized his intellectual attributes. Nonetheless, this insight has to be briefly 
illustrated and stressed, for it is the key to recognizing the political uses of natural 
philosophy. '' 
A division of natural philosophies into voluntarist and intellectualist orienta- 
tions was not peculiar to the Leibniz-Clarke controversies. The natural philoso- 
phers whom Clarke followed had strongly emphasized the supremacy of  God's 
will. Robert Boyle had construed a law of nature to be a "notional rule of acting 
according to the declared will of a superior"; God continually exerts his providen- 
tial will  in nature. The Cambridge Platonists  asserted that  "all  created being 
whatsoever  owes the  continuation  and perpetuity  of  its  existence . . . to the 
Divine will only."  Newton's  own philosophy  of  nature was firmly  anchored in 
voluntarism  and limited voluntari~m:'~  his appreciation  of  God's supreme will 
was fundamental to his ontology and epistemology. Newton explained how mat- 
ter could be created ex nihilo and how our minds could be made to attain the idea 
of  matter  by  reference  to the  action  of  God's  will  upon  absolute space.  In 
Newton's theology man was recommended to reverence God not for his eternity 
and omniscience, which were his necessary attributes, but for the freedom of his 
will.  Newton's  God was  an active force  in  the cosmos, continually ordering, 
sustaining, and disposing."  In the General Scholium to the second edition of the 
Principia,written during the height of his personal disputes with Leibniz, Newton 
addressed the theme of God's active government of the natural world with great 
vigor. There is little point, Newton said, in referring to a God whose attributes do 
not include volitional dominion over his servants. We are to adore God "as  his 
servants; and a God without dominion, providence, and final causes, is nothing 
but Fate and Nature.  "zO 
"See  esp. Koyre, From the Closed World, pp. 235-776,  on the so-called "intellectualist-voluntarist" 
dimensions of  Clarke vs.  Leibniz; see also Iltis,  "Leibnizian-Newtonian  Debates," pp. 347-348; 
Priestley, "Clarke-Leibniz Controversy"; and Edwin Arthur Burtt, The  Metaphysical Foundations of 
Modern Science (New York: Harcourt, Brace 8r Co., 1927), pp. 280-299. 
'"obert  Boyle, "A Free Inquiry into the Vulgarly Received Notion of Nature,"  in Thomas Birch, 
ed.,  U'orks  of  Robert  Royle,  5 vols.  (London,  1744), Vol.  IV, pp.  358-424,  on  p.  367; Ralph 
Cudworth, The True Intellectual  System, 2 vols.  (1st Amer. ed., Andover, New Hampshire, 1837- 
1838), Vol.  I, pp.  104-105.  See also John  William  Duff, "Miracles  in  a World  of  Atoms? The 
Centrality of Providence in Walter Charleton's Mechanical Philosophy" (B.A. diss., Harvard Univ., 
1979); Francis Oakley, "Christian Theology and the Newtonian Science: The Rise of the Concept of 
the Laws of Nature,"  Church History, 1961, 30:433-457;  David Kubrin, "Newton and the Cyclical 
Cosmos: Providence  and  the  Mechanical  Philosophy,"  J.  Hist.  Ideas,  1967, 28:326-346;  J. E. 
McGuire,  "Boyle's  Conception of  Nature,"  J.  Hist.  Ideas,  1972, 33523-542;  Margaret J. Osler, 
"Descartes and Charleton on Nature and God," J. Hist. Ideas, 1979, 40:445-456. 
"Martin  Tamny, "Newton,  Creation, and Perception,"  Isis,  1979, 70:48-58;  Frank E. Manuel, 
The Religion of Isaac Newton (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,  1974), esp. pp. 21-22. 
2uIsaac  Newton,  Philosophiae  naturalis principia  ttlathematica  (Cambridge, 1713), pp. 482-483, 193  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
The invocation of  God's supreme will  as an explanatory and apologetic re- 
source remained a commonplace among Newton's Anglican followers during the 
late  seventeenth and  early  eighteenth  centuries.  In his  1692 Boyle  lectures 
Richard Bentley dissolved the problem of the connection between soul and body 
into an exercise of God's will: "I resolve all that into the sole pleasure and fiat  of 
our  omnipotent  Creator. . . ."  Roger  Cotes  expressed  no  doubt  that  "this 
World, so diversified with that variety of forms and motions we find in it, could 
arise from nothing but the perfectly free will of God directing and presiding over 
all."  And John Maxwell's  Discourse  Concerning God used language strikingly 
similar to that in Newton's General Scholium: "My proposition is, that God is not 
rightly defined, a Being absolutely Perfect but that he is more rightly defined, a 
Spiritual Being endued with Absolute Dominion. . . . A perfect Being, without 
Dominion, would be only an object of  contemplation and admiration, not of 
worship. . .  ."?I  One of the most vigorous celebrations of God's will was offered 
by Clarke himself  in his 1704-1705  Boyle lectures. Like Newton, Clarke main- 
tained that a God who did not volitionally and actively intercede in the affairs of 
the world was no God: "If  therefore God does not concern himself in the Govern- 
ment of the World, nor has any regard to what is done therein; it will follow that 
he is not an Omnipresent, All-powerful,  Intelligent  and Wise Being; and con- 
sequently, that he Is not at all."  God's necessary attributes were less worthy of 
man's reverence than God's active exercise of  his perfectly free and sovereign 
will.22 
In  the  1715-1716  exchanges  with  Leibniz  Clarke's  emphasis  upon  God's 
supreme will was considerably sharpened; nowhere else does the voluntarist cast 
of Newtonian thought appear quite as clearly. The protagonists' conflicting views 
of  God's role in the natural order were expressed through the standard seven- 
teenth- and early eighteenth-century clock metaphor. According to Leibniz, "Sir 
Isaac Newton, and his followers,  have also a very odd opinion concerning the 
work of God. According to their doctrine, God Almighty wants to wind up his 
watch from time to time. . . . He  had not, it seems, sufficient foresight to make it 
a perpetual motion. . . . [The Newtonians] must needs have a very mean notion 
of the wisdom and power  of  God."23 To this, of  course, Clarke had  a ready 
quoting from Newton,  The Mathematical  Principles of  Natural Philosophy,  trans. Andrew Motte 
(London, 1729), Vol. 11, p. 391. 
"Richard  Bentley,  Matter  and  Motion  Cannot  Think: or, a Confutation of  Atheism from  the 
Faculties of  the Soul, in Alexander Dyce, ed., Works of  Richard Bentley,  3 vols. (London: Francis 
Macpherson,  1836-1838),  Vol.  111,  pp.  27-50,  on p. 47;  Roger Cotes, "Preface,"  to Newton, 
Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy  (1729), Vol. 1, Sig. A7V;  John Maxwell, A Discourse 
Concerning  God  (London,  1715),  pp.  2,  4,  93;  quoted  in  Priestley,  "Clarke-Leibniz  Contro-
versy,"  p. 47n. Maxwell was prebendary of  Connor in Ireland from  1720; his 1727 translation  of 
Cumberland's De legibus naturae (see n. 40) was subscribed to by Clarke and Newton and contained 
an essay by Maxwell defending Clarke on the immateriality of the soul. 
22Samuel  Clarke, A Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God: more particularly  in answer 
to  Mr.  Hobbs,  Spinoza,  and  their followers;  Clarke,  A  Discourse  Concerning the  Unchangeable 
Obligations of  Natural Religion;  both in John Clarke, ed., The Works of  Samuel  Clarke, Vol. 11, 
pp. 513-577,  579-733,  quoting p. 602. 
23 Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, pp. 11-12.  On the clock metaphor generally: L. Laudan, "The 
Clock-Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of  Descartes on English Methodological Thought, 
1650-  1665," Annals of  Science, 1966,22:73- 104. Note that it is Leibniz who introduced the notion 
of a clockwork universe; the Newtonians were never comfortable with this conception, preferring, as 
did  the Cambridge Platonists,  a world  order maintained  by  immanent  divine activity; see P. M. 
Heimann,  "'Nature  is  a  Perpetual Worker':  Newton's  Aether  and  Eighteenth-Century  Natural 
Philosophy," Ambix, 1973,20:1-25.  Nevertheless,  the Newtonians were prepared to defend the less 
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riposte. Any schema which stressed God's perfect wisdom ran the risk of seeming 
to impugn his perfect and sovereign will. It was a risk the Newtonians declined to 
take. As Clarke said, "the  true glory of  God's workmanship is that nothing is 
done without  his continual government and inspection."  To conceive of  God 
without the ability to intercede in the natural world tends "to exclude providence 
and God's government in reality out of the world." A God without the ability to 
intercede was no God at all; God's government was manifest both in his framing 
of  the regular laws of  nature and in his intermittent suspension or alteration of 
those laws,  subject to his sovereign will and pleasure.14 Against this notion of 
God the clock mender, Leibniz brought to bear his great principle of  sufficient 
reason. Clarke was  happy  to accept  the principle  that nothing  is  "without  a 
sufficient reason why it is," but he insisted that "this sufficient reason is oft-times 
no other, than the mere will of  God." As for God's wisdom, this consisted "in 
framing originally the perfect and complete idea of  a work,  which  begun  and 
continues, according to that original perfect idea, by the continual uninterrupted 
exercise of his power and government." Thus even Leibniz's arguments in favor 
of God's paramount wisdom were turned into evidence of  the supremacy of  his 
will.?' 
Preferences for a voluntaristically or intellectualistically  conceived God were 
consequential-quite  obviously for other matters in metaphysics and the philoso- 
phy of  nature, less obviously consequential for the technical components of  the 
Newtonian  schema which  Clarke celebrated  and  defended  against  attack. In 
Newton's celestial physics the particular "clock"  requiring God's volitional inter- 
position and correction was the solar system. Irrrgularities in planetary motions 
that, if  left to accumulate, would result in the destruction of  the solar system's 
natural order, needed, in  Newton's  view, the Deity's intercession to set them 
right. In the Optice of 1706 Newton noted "some inconsiderable Irregularities" in 
planetary motions "which  will be apt to increase, till this System wants a Refor- 
mati~n."'~ From this astronomical fact one could, if  so inclined, construct a proof 
of the existence of an interventionist God. Samuel Clarke was so inclined; before 
the publication of the Optice Clarke asked in his Boyle lectures whether God's 
existence as a volitional actor was not proved by "the preservation of the several 
Systems, and of the several Planets and Comets in the same System, from falling 
upon each other; which  in  infinite  past  Time  (had  there been  no Intelligent 
Governor of  the Whole,) could  not but have been  the Effect  of  the smallest 
possible Resistence  made by  the finest Aether, and even by  the Rays of Light 
themselves, to the Motions . . . of Those Bodies?"?'  Pressed by Leibniz ten years 
later, Clarke amplified what was meant by  the Newtonian  "reformation,"  and 
how the intermittent exercise of  God's  will,  far from denigrating his wisdom, 
actually  glorified  it.  "Amendment"  or  "correction,"  Clarke stipulated, were 
relative  terms, referring to human apprehensions of  the events. But in  God's 
mind all "disorder"  and apparent alteration of the frame of things were parts of the 
Z4 Leibniz-Clarke  Correspondence,  p.  14.  In  17th-century  theological  parlance  these  notions 
corresponded to God's "ordinary"  and "absolute powers"  (or "concourse");  see McGuire, "Boyle's 
Conception of Nature,"  p. 526. 
*'Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, pp.  20, 22. The classic account of  Leibniz's principle of  suf- 
ficient reason is Arthur 0.Lovejoy, The Great Chain of  Being (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. 
Press,  1936), Ch. V. 
Z61saac  Newton, Optice (London, 1706), pp. 345-346;  quoting Query 31, Newton,  Opticks (2nd 
ed., London, 1718), p. 378. See in this connection Kubrin, "Newton  and the Cyclical Cosmos." 
"Clarke,  Being and Attributes  of  God, p. 571. 195  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
original perfect design: "the  wisdom and foresight of  God, consist . . . in con- 
triving at once, what his power and government is continually putting into actual 
execution."28 
Three important issues  in  metaphysics and natural philosophy were closely 
linked  to the voluntarist-intellectualist  cleavages evident in the Clarke-Leibniz 
exchanges: first, the question of  God's knowledge and direction of the natural 
world; second, the question of a plenum versus a vacuum; and third, the question 
of the properties of matter. As we have seen, Newton specified absolute time and 
space as necessary attributes of God, thus making matter ontologically contingent 
upon the exercise of God's will. In the Queries to the 1706 Optice Newton had 
invited a reading which equated absolute space with God's "sensorium."29 Leib- 
niz accepted the apparent invitation. Newton stood convicted as a materialist by 
his own words; Newton's God, Leibniz told Clarke, "stands in need of [an] organ 
to perceive things by."  Newton was to be tarred with the same brush Leibniz 
applied to L~cke.~O 
The problem arose from the Newtonians' desire for a God who was immanent 
enough in the natural world to know it intimately, to sustain its routine opera- 
tions, and to suspend or alter them as he willed. However, as with the Cambridge 
Platonists, such a conception could without due care slide into one of God as "the 
soul of the worldw-a  notion to which the Newtonian voluntarist tradition was, 
for reasons we shall see, unremittingly ho~tile.~'  Hence, if  it could be shown that 
Newton's conception of absolute space as God's sensorium rendered God imma- 
nent in the world, then it might be argued that the Newtonians actually held the 
very doctrine to which they averred repugnance. Leibniz attempted so to argue. 
A rightly understood God, Leibniz said, is intelligentia supramundana: "Will they 
say, that he is intelligentia mundana; that is, the soul of the world? I hope not." 
Clarke sprang to Newton's  defense; Newton, he claimed, only referred to space 
as God's sensorium in a metaphorical sense, but how else could God volitionally 
affect the world's workings than by his immanence? "Nothing can any more act, 
or be acted upon, where it is not present; than it can be, where it is n~t."~"n 
fact, Clarke had been defending such a conception of God's immanence for years. 
In his 1704-1705  Boyle lectures he insisted that God had no corporeal proper- 
ties whatever, and in a sermon preached before the queen in 1711 he stressed the 
metaphorical nature of any reference to the passions or corporeal organs of a God 
"who,  in  reality,  without Shape or Figure is  in  all  Places  every where  alike 
Present. . . ."33 
28 Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, pp. 22-23. 
29See  Queries 20, 23 of Newton, Optice, pp. 315, 346; Queries 28, 31 of Newton, Opticks (1718), 
pp. 345, 379. The question of a variant  version  of  the Optice which might have affected Leibniz's 
reading is explored in KoyrC and Cohen, "Case of  the Missing Tanquam,"  but note the erroneous 
reference there to a 24th Query in the 1706 text. 
30Leibniz-Clarke  Correspondence, p. 11; see Leibniz to Bernoulli,  27 May  1716, where he com- 
ments on this  aspect of  the Clarke correspondence and says that  "today  space is the idol of  the 
English":  Correspondence of  Newton, Vol. VI, pp. 353-357,  on p. 356. 
31F~r Boyle's argument against construing God as anima mundi see Boyle, "AFree Inquiry,"  esp. 
p. 363; Henry More admitted a "soul of the world," but rigorously distinguished it from God himself: 
The Immortality of  the Soul (London, 1662), Ch. XVI. Clarke's Boyle lectures are full of  remarks 
hostile to those representing God as the soul of the world. 
32 Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, pp. 19, 21-22. 
33Clarke, Being  and  Attributes  of  God, p. 540;  Samuel Clarke,  "Sermon  Preach'd  before the 
Queen, 7th of January, 1710-11,"  in Sermons, ed. John Clarke, 11 vols. (7th ed., London, 1749), 
Vol. XI, pp.  101-117,  on pp.  108-109;  cf. Clarke, "Of  the Spirituality of  God," in ibid., Vol. I, 
pp. 26-27.  For relevant  passages  in  Newton's  own  writings  which may  have  been  responses  to 196  STEVEN SHAPIN 
Leibniz  and  the Newtonians also clashed on the quantity  of  matter in  the 
universe. Leibniz maintained that the cosmos was full of  matter and that New- 
tonian action-at-a-distance gravitation was impossible on both physical and the- 
ological grounds. When Leibniz charged the Newtonian schema with giving aid 
and comfort to materialists, Clarke responded that Newtonianism proved "matter, 
or body, to be the smallest and most inconsiderable part of the universe." Almost 
the whole universe was free of matter, a theater for the play of active forces. To 
Leibniz, however, the more matter the merrier; the more there is "the more God 
has occasion  to exercise his wisdom  and power. Which  is  one reason,  among 
others.  why  I  maintain  that there is  no vacuum  at all."  A vacuum in  nature 
amounts to an imperfection: an aspersion  cast against God's wisdom. Clarke 
responded that a void has no affect on God's wisdom and has the advantage of 
providing greater scope for the action of his will, for in that void work the active 
forces, the delegates of that will. The greater their role in natural philosophy, the 
greater the role for God's providential 
Finally, the Leibniz-Clarke exchanges manifested radically divergent concep- 
tions of the nature of matter and its properties. The conflict hinged upon whether 
matter was  to be conceived of  as inanimate, devoid of  inherent properties of 
activity, motion, and sentience (as the Newtonians maintained), or  whether it was 
construed as essentially active and sentient (as in Leibniz's metaphysics). Apart 
from the issue whether gravity was inherent in matter, the question of  matter 
theory was largely implicit in the exchanges themselves. Yet matter theory was of 
fundamental importance to conceptions of God's attributes and his relationship 
to the natural world. The Newtonian heritage, deriving as it did from Boyle's 
corpuscularianism and the Cambridge Platonists' philosophy of God and nature, 
was predicated upon a view of matter as "brute and stupid."35 If matter could not 
move itself or arrange its own patterned motions, then it must be God who causes 
it ultimately to do so. An immanent God was more than a First Cause, for he 
continually sustains the patterns of  activity in the world.  If, as Boyle and the 
Newtonians maintained,  substance is devoid of  inherent properties of  activity, 
motion, or sentience, then individual existents can have no inherent connections 
with each other and natural laws are imposed from without, by the will of God. In 
the Newtonian schema brute matter and God's providential will were comple- 
mentary concepts.36  Contrastingly, Leibnizian appreciations of  God's supreme 
wisdom and the preestablished harmony of the universe were founded on views of 
matter as ultimately active and sentient. By positing inherent qualities of motion 
Leibniz's criticisms see Newton, Principia (1726), p. 529; Newton, Mathenratical Principles of Natural 
Philosophy  (1729),  Vol.  11, p.  391; Newton,  Opticks (1718), p. 379.  See also I. Bernard Cohen, 
Introduction  to Newton's "Principia"  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard  Univ.  Press,  1971), pp. 24311, 
250-251. 
34Leibniz-Clarke  Correspondence, pp. 12, 16, 21; cf. Arnold Thackray, "'Matter  in a Nut-Shell': 
Newton's  Opticks and Eighteenth-Century Chemistry,"  Ambix, 1968, 15:29-53;  Thackray, Atoms 
and Powers: An Essay on Newtonian Matter-Theory and the Development of Chemistry (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Harvard  Univ.  Press,  1970), pp.  53-67;  J.  E. McGuire, "Force,  Active Principles,  and 
Newton's Invisible Realm," Ambix, 1968, 15:154-208. 
"This  heritage is delineated and its ideological significance traced by  J. R. Jacob, Robert Boyle 
and the English Revolution (New York: Burt Franklin,  1977); M. C. Jacob, Newtonians; J. R. Jacob 
and M. C. Jacob, "The Anglican Origins of  Modern Science: The Metaphysical Foundations of the 
Whig Constitution," Isis,  1980, 71:251-267;  and Shapin, "Social  Uses of  Science." 
3hFor an excellent  comparison  of  Boyle  and Leibniz  on this  subject  see  McGuire,  "Boyle's 
Conception of Nature,"  pp. 524-528. 197  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
and  "perception"  in  his  monads,  Leibniz  made  them  self-sufficient  entities, 
independent of  God's continuing superintendence. Since they were themselves 
"the  sources of  their internal actions"  and since they possessed inherent rela- 
tional attributes, monads contained the basis of  the preestablished harmony of 
the world. God's wisdom, in his original perfect plan, created the monads so that 
natural laws were the working out of the inherent qualities of substance through 
the interconnections of things.37  In such an antinominalist schema there was little 
scope for the exercise of providential will so valued by the Newtonians. 
THE NEWTONIANS' DOMESTIC ENEMIES 
By the time of  the 1715-1716  exchanges with Leibniz,  most of  Clarke's argu- 
ments in favor of  the Newtonian world view had a considerable history behind 
them.3s  They had been developed and deployed, by Clarke and other apologetic 
writers, in an attempt to secure Christianity against threats from its perceived 
enemies. The major site of this joint  defense of Newtonianism and Christianity 
was, as Margaret Jacob has shown, the lecture series founded in 1691 by Robert 
Boyle for "proving  the Christian  Religion, against notorious  infidel^."^^  The 
enemies of proper Christianity were explicitly identified. In the first of the series, 
preached in  1692, the Reverend Richard Bentley argued against those writers 
who maintained that mere matter and motion were capable of  producing  the 
phenomena of sentience. Twenty years later, in Bentley's Remarks upon a Late 
Discourse of Free-thinking, he mounted a frontal attack on the views of Anthony 
Collins and John Toland. In 1698 the Reverend John Harris set about to confute 
modern  "Hobbists"  and "Spinozists,"  who denied the reality of  spirit or who 
conceived  of  matter  as  active;  special  opprobrium was  reserved  for Charles 
Blount.  The  Reverend  Samuel  Clarke's  Boyle  lectures  of  1704-1705  were 
labeled  as  an  "answer  to Mr. Hobbs,  Spinoza,  and their  followers."  These 
followers were  named  as Toland  and Charles Blount. Later, as the Leibniz- 
Clarke exchanges were concluding, Clarke published a vehement denunciation of 
a work by Collins denying human liberty. In the Boyle lectures of 1713-  1714 the 
Reverend Benjamin Ibbot inveighed against the irreligious tendencies of modern 
English free-thought, singling out Anthony Collins for particular odium theologi- 
cum. Nor were these the only writers with Newtonian affiliations to attack the 
views of Blount, Collins, and Toland: George Cheyne, John Keill. John Maxwell, 
and John Hancock also figured pr~minently.~') 
;'For  Leibniz's  views  of  substance  see  J. E.  McGuire,  "'Labyrinthus  Continui':  Leibniz  on 
Substance, Activity, and Matter," in Peter K. Machamer and Robert G. Turnbull, eds., Motion and 
Time, Space and Matter (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1976), pp. 290-327;  Ian Hacking, 
"Individual  Substance."  in Harry G. Frankfurt. ed., Leibniz: A Collection of  Critical Essays (Notre 
Dame, Ind.: Univ. Notre Dame Press, 1976), pp. 137-153;  see also n. 85. 
'8Hall,  Philosophers  at  War, p. 232, notes this fact, but seems to think that this diminishes the 
significance of the metaphysical and natural-philosophical  controversies. 
"M.  C. Jacob, Newtonians, Chs. IV-V. 
40Bentley,Matter and Motion Cannot Think; Richard Bentley, Remarks upon a Late Discourse of 
Free-thinking . . . , in Works,  Vol. 111, pp. 287-474;  John Harris, The Atheistical Objections, against 
the Being ofa God, and His Attrib~ctes,  Fairly Considered, and Fully Refuted (London, 1698), Sermon 
I, p. 20; Sermon 11,  pp. 5-8;  Sermon 111, pp. 4-6,  16, 25, et  passim  (after about  1706 Harris's 
position moved closer to Toland's: see Geoffrey Bowles, "John  Harris and the Powers of Matter," 
Ambix,  1975. 22:21-38);  Clarke,  Being and  Attributes  of  God, pp. 531-535,  544; John  Clarke, 
Remarks upon a Book, entituled, Philosophical Enquiry Concerning Human 1,iberty (London, 1717); 
Benjamin Ibbot, A  Course of Sermons Preach'd for  the Lecture Founded by the Honourable Robert 198  STEVEN SHAPIN 
What were the views which proved so repugnant to Anglican Newtonians of the 
period? Of what possible relevance to the 1715-  1716 Leibniz-Clarke exchanges 
is the conflict between these groups? The circle of  late seventeenth- and early 
eighteenth-century English writers which included Charles Blount (1654-  1693), 
Anthony Collins (1676-  1729), William  Coward (1657-  1725), Matthew Tindal 
(1657-  1733), and John Toland  (1670-1722)  tended to style themselves  free- 
thinkers. Their opponents variously characterized them as freethinkers, deists, 
atheists, Socinians, Hobbists, Spinozists, and "Hereticks."  It is risky to construct 
a group portrait of this circle: they differed from one another on some points, and 
individual members changed and developed their philosophies over time. Never- 
theless,  certain  stable features of their writings  are noticeable,  especially as 
these were the features that Clarke, Bentley, Ibbot, and others uniformly attri- 
buted to them and that their enemies regarded as especially odious and worthy of 
~ondemnation.~' 
First, the freethinkers rejected the Newtonian insistence upon a conception of 
matter as "brute and stupid." As Toland wrote in his Letters to  Serena, ".  . . Mat-
ter is necessarily active as well as extended"; ".  . . all the Matter in Nature, every 
Part and Parcel of it, has bin ever in motion, and can never be otherwi~e."~~  By 
conjoining the idea of  matter with  the idea of  activity, and by  stipulating the 
eternality of  that motion, Toland eroded the Newtonian notion of  God as the 
First Cause of activity. Secondly, the inherent activity of matter was extended to 
encompass its inherent sentience.  Collins maintained that matter,  suitably ar- 
ranged, might be able itself to produce thought. Toland went further. By the time 
of his 1720 Pantheisticon, he had adopted a full-blown pantheistic materialism in 
which matter, with its inherent properties, was the only entity in the cosmos.43 
Boyle, Esq; at  the  Church of  St. Mary  le Bow, in the Years 1713 and  1714 (London,  1727),  Pt. I, 
pp. 44,  50, 87-88,  211-213,  et passim. Among other Boyle lectures, see William Derham, Physico-
Theology: or A  Demonstration  of  the Being  and Attributes  of  God, from  His  Works of  Creation 
(London, 1713); Francis Gastrell, "The Certainty and Necessity of  Religion in General . . . ," in A 
Defence  of  Natural  and  Revealed  Religion  la  collection  of  Boyle  lectures  1691-17321,  3  vols. 
(London, 1739), Vol. I, pp. 275-352,  on p. 288; John Hancock[e], "Arguments to Prove the Being of 
God . . . ," in ibid., Vol. 11, pp. 197-258,  on pp. 202,215,  257. Also George Cheyne, Philosophical 
Principles of Natural Religion (London, 1705), Dedication, Sig. A4';  John Keill, An Examination of 
Dr.  Burnet's  Theory of  the Earth  (Oxford,  16Y8), pp. 36-37;  John Maxwell, "A  Summary of  the 
Controversy between Dr. Samuel Clarke and an Anonymous Author, Concerning the Immateriality 
of Thinking Substance," Appendix to Richard Cumberland, A  Treatise of the Laws of Nature, trans. 
Maxwell (London, 1727). 
41Their  major works include Charles Blount, Anima Mundi and The Oracles of Reason, both in The 
Miscellaneous Works  of Charles Blount, Esq. (London, 1695); W[illiam] C[owardl, The Grand Essay: 
or a  Vindication of  Reason,  and  Religion,  against  the  Impostures of  Philosophy (London,  1704); 
Anthony  Collins, A  Discourse  of  Freethinking  (London,  1713);  Collins, A  Philosophical  Inquiry 
Concerning Human Liberty  (London, 1717);  Matthew Tindal, The Rights of  the  Christian Church 
(London,  1707);  John Toland,  Letters  to Serena  (London,  1704),  and others cited  below.  Good 
sources on the English deists include M. C. Jacob, Newtonians, Ch. VI; M. C. Jacob, The Radical 
Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans (London: Allen & Unwin, in press); Alfred 
Owen Aldridge, Shaftesbury and the Deist Manifesto (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 
1951); Roland N. Stromberg, Religious Liberalism in Eighteenth-Century  England (London: Oxford 
Univ. Press,  1954); John Redwood, Reason, Ridicule, and  Religion:  The Age of  Enlightenment in 
England 1660-1750  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979); Redwood, "Blount, Deism and 
English  Free Thought,"  J. Hist.  Ideas,  1974,  35:490-498.  One of  the  best  brief  contemporary 
summaries of  the "principles  of  atheism"  is Ibbot, Course of Sermons, Pt. 11, p. 75. 
4ZToland, Letters  to  Serena,  pp.  164,  167;  cf.  similar  views  in  Coward,  Grand  Essay,  esp. 
pp.  152-  153. 
43Anthony Collins, Reflections  on Mr.  Clark's Second  Defence  of  His  Letter  to Mr.  Dodwell 
(London, 1707),  p. 24; John Toland, Pantheisticon: or, the Form of Celebrating the Socratic-Society, 
trans. anon. (London, 1751;  1st ed., 1720). For more on Toland and pantheistic materialism  see 199  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
There was simply no need for external spiritual agencies to animate a sluggish 
material world,  for the freethinkers did not conceive of  matter as inanimate. 
Insofar as they did admit a God recognizable as such by more orthodox Chris- 
tians, it was God as anima mundi; there was no God distinct from nature.j4  And 
even those freethinkers who disowned such a conception were accused of  pan- 
theistic materialism by their Anglican enemies. Thirdly, the freethinkers argued 
that proper  religion  was  rational;  there were  no "mysteries"  associated  with 
Christianity save those introduced by corrupt priests. Toland's  Christianity Not 
Mysterious and Blount's  Oracles of Reason were the earliest shots fired in the 
freethinkers' campaign against elements of established religion in England. From 
1707 Collins was arguing for the autonomy and supremacy of reason in all intel- 
lectual inquiries, especially religion; he asserted that authority worked solely to 
fetter and corrupt  proper religious understanding,  and he denied  the role of 
revelation. In 1707 and 1708 Collins mischievously joined  forces with the non- 
juring Henry Dodwell to dispute with Samuel Clarke the role of reason in religion 
and the mortality of the  Fourthly, the freethinkers espoused the view that 
human actions were not free but were.  rather, the outcomes of necessity. Thus 
Collins's Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty (a book which Priest- 
ley said converted him to determinism) argued that free will is an illusion and 
that, in fact, even our commonsense experience of action provides testimony to 
moral necessity.j6 Finally,  insofar as the freethinkers'  natural order actually 
required a Deity, it was based upon a God who framed an original all-wise and 
immanent design rather than upon one who intermittently had to exercise his 
providential will. One  can see how this conception of the Deity was built into the 
freethinkers' cosmology: if  matter were indeed inherently imbued with activity 
and sentience, then the patterned phenomena of nature could be accounted for 
by principles immanent in itself; there was simply no need for external animating 
agencies or the imposition of activity and order from without. Anglican apolo- 
gists, quite understandably, saw little difference between the freethinkers' God 
and no God at 
M. C. Jacob,  "Newtonian  Science and the  Radical  Enlightenment:"  Vistas in Astronomy,  1979, 
22:545-555;  M. C. Jacob, Radical Enlightenment. 
44See,  e.g., Coward, Grand Essay, for an attack on immaterial substances in general. The explicit 
identification of God as "the soul of the world"  was in fact rarely professed during this period. Anima 
mundi  beliefs,  like  atheism,  are perhaps  best  understood  as a  tendency  and  as  an accusation: 
freethinkers were accused of conceiving God to be "the soul of the world";  some of them actually did 
so. Leibniz was inclined to accuse the Newtonians of  this view, knowing it would damage their case; 
and Newton and Clarke were as keen to suggest that both Leibniz and the freethinkers recommended 
this notion of the Deity. In  practice, any  tendency  to restrict God's  providence  or to make him 
immanent in the natural world ran the risk of drawing this stigma. Hence, all parties were vulnerable 
to some degree. 
45 John Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious (London, 1696), which capitalized on John Locke, The 
Reasonableness  qf Christianity  (London,  1695); Blount,  Oracles of  Reason; Anthony Collins, An 
Essay Concerning the Use of Reason in Propositions (London, 1707): Collins, A Reply to Mr. Clark's 
Defence of His Letter to Mr. Dodwell (London, 1707): for the Collins-Clarke-Dodwell disputes see 
James O'Higgins, Anthony Collins: The Man and His Works (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,  1970), 
Ch.  V. 
46Collins,Philosophical Inquiry Concerning Human Liberty, esp. pp. 71-75,  where Collins argues 
against human liberty on the basis of God's prescient wisdom. An insoluble problem results, he says, 
from maintaining that man is free and that God is all-knowing. Since God must be all-wise and all- 
foreseeing, then man cannot freely choose his actions. See also O'Higgins, Collins, p. 9711. 
47For  a typical expression of this, see Harris, Atheistical Objections, Sermon 11, p. 7: "if  they make 
him such an Impotent and Careless Being, as either cannot or will not govern the World, give Laws to 
his  People,  vindicate  his  own  Honour,  and punish  and reward  Men according to their Actions: 
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It should be evident from even this brief  sketch that there were crucial cos- 
mological resources which  were shared between the English freethinkers and 
Leibniz.  These  links  are apparent both  from  the  texts  themselves  and  from 
Anglican  Newtonians'  responses  to each.  It  is  possible  that  Clarke and  his 
colleagues saw more than intellectual similarities between Leibniz and the free- 
thinking canon: they may have perceived substantive connections. John Toland's 
mysterious missions to Hanover and Berlin in 1701 and 1702 (possibly as a spy), 
when he conveyed the Act of  Settlement to the Hanoverian court, were widely 
publicized in England. He met and conversed with Leibniz at this time and again 
in 1707. Before the publication of  Leibniz's  Theodicy in  1710, Toland read the 
proofs in Amsterdam.  In  1708 Toland was apparently boasting of  his contacts 
with  Leibniz,  and both were  known  to have  important  links  to the court of 
Eugene of Savoy. Toland and Leibniz agreed that they shared certain goals, such 
as the  desire  to  "crush  superstition"  and  securely  establish  the  Hanoverian 
succession, even though  it  is  quite clear  that Leibniz heartily disapproved  of 
Toland's developing pantheism.48  There is no doubt Anglican Newtonians per- 
ceived similarities between Leibniz's philosophy and that of  English deists and 
freethinker^.^^  What is  neither  a valid  inference nor necessary  to the present 
interpretation is that Leibniz and the English freethinkers had the same purposes 
in constructing their world views. 
This brief  account of  the perceived  similarities between Leibniz's  views and 
those of  Collins, Toland, and others does not purport to make Leibniz into an 
actor on the English political stage, even though, as we have seen, it is important 
to bear in mind  that his interests were bound up with the course of  the Hano- 
verian  succession.  Nonetheless  the  content  and course of  the Leibniz-Clarke 
controversies cannot be properly understood without recognizing that they were 
situated in the political context of  preexisting disputes between Anglican New- 
tonian~  and their indigenous disloyal opposition. The conflicts in  natural phi- 
losophy and metaphysics have to be referred to the concrete social and political 
interests of the groups using these sorts of culture as apologetic resources. 
4XM.C. Jacob,  Newtonians,  p.  230;  F. H. Heinemann,  "Toland  and Leibniz,"  Philosophical 
Review,  1945, 54:437-457;  Lord Raby to Leibniz, 29 Dec. 1707, and Leibniz to Toland, 30 Apr. 
1709, both in Kemble, State Papers, pp. 464-465,  467-470;  also G. W. Leibniz, "Annotatiunculae 
subitaneae ad librum de Christianismo Mysteriis carente: Conscriptae 8 Augusti 1701," in A  Collec-
tion of Several Pieces of Mr. John Toland, 2 vols. (London, 1726), Vol. 11, pp. 60-76.  Heinemann, 
"Toland  and  Leibniz,"  argues that  the contacts  between  the  two  provide  evidence  that Leibniz 
"influenced"  Toland, a view which is rejected by M. C. Jacob, Newtonians, p. 23111.  The present 
argument is not that Leibniz "influenced"  Toland, but that the two were perceived to utilize common 
philosophical resources: a perception which was reinforced by  the knowledge of  contacts between 
them. 
4'See  the accounts of  similarities between  Leibniz's  and Collins's  views in  O'Higgins,  Collins, 
pp. 97, 99-  102, 106-107;  Clarke, Remarks upon a Book, bound with John Clarke, A  Collection 
of Papers, which Passed between the Late Learned Mr. Leibnitz, and Dr. Clarke, in the Years 1715and 
1716. That a connection was perceived between the Leibniz-Clarke exchanges and the Collins-Clarke 
exchanges appears from a letter from Collins to Desmaizeux, who was editing the Leibniz-Clarke 
papers: "Let not the collection of Leibniz's and Clarke's Papers etc. now printing in Holland wait for 
my  reply  to  Dr. Clarke."  (British  Library  MSS  Add.  4282,  fol.  150,  17 June  1718; quoted  in 
M. C. Jacob, Radical Enlightenment.) It has been suggested that Leibniz thought highly of Hobbes's 
metaphysics and physics and was indebted to him for his concepts of  conatus and monads; whether 
these similarities were widely perceived  remains to be investigated. See J. W. N. Watkins, Hobbes's 
System of Ideas: A Study in the Political Significance of Philosophical Theories (New York: Barnes & 
Noble,  1968), pp.  125-132;  Howard R. Bernstein,  "Conatus, Hobbes,  and the Young Leibniz," 
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WHIG AND TORY, COURT AND COUNTRY: IDEOLOGIES OF ORDER 
The invitation  to consider  the Leibniz-Clarke  metaphysical  and  natural phi- 
losophical  conflicts  in  the context  of  English  political affairs comes from the 
participants  themselves.  In Clarke's reply  to Leibniz's  first paper the English 
divine commenced by identifying the universe of the perfectly working clock as 
"the notion of materialism and fate," tending "to exclude providence and God's 
government in reality out of the world." He continued: 
And by the same reason that a philosopher can represent all things going on from the 
beginning of the creation, without any government or interposition of providence; a 
sceptic will  easily argue still further backwards, and suppose that things have from 
eternity gone on (as they now do) without any true creation or original author at all, 
but only what such arguers call all-wise and eternal nature. If a king had a kingdom, 
wherein all things would continually go on without his government or  interposition, or 
without his attending to or ordering what is done therein; it would be to him, merely a 
nominal kingdom; nor would he in reality deserve at all the title of king or governor. 
And as those men, who pretend that in  an earthly government things may go on 
perfectly  well  without  the  king  himself  ordering or disposing  of  any  thing,  may 
reasonably  be  suspected that they would  like  very  well  to set  the king  aside:  so 
whosoever contends, that the course of the world  can go on without the continual 
direction of God, the Supreme Governor; his doctrine does in effect tend to exclude 
God out of the world. 
Leibniz rose to the bait: 
The comparison of a king, under whose reign every thing should go on without his 
interposition, is by no means to the present purpose; . . . . 'Tis just as if  one should say, 
that  a  king,  who  should  originally  have  taken  care  to have  his  subjects  so well 
educated, and should, by his care in providing for their subsistence, preserve them so 
well in their fitness for their several stations, and in their good affection towards him, 
as that he should have no occasion ever to be amending any thing amongst them; 
would be only a nominal king. 
It would  appear  from  these passages  that  Leibniz  and  Clarke had  radically 
differing conceptions of  proper kingship. It would also appear that Clarke was 
pointing towards elements within English society whose notions of political order 
were dangerously threatening. In Clarke's dedication of the 1717 publication of 
the exchanges to Princess Caroline he makes the political context of metaphysical 
conflict even more concrete: 
By the Protestant Succession in the illustrious house of Hanover having taken place, 
this nation has now . . . a certain prospect, (if our own vices and follies prevent not) 
of seeing government actually administered, according to the design and end for which 
it was instituted by providence.  . . . We have a prospect of seeing the true liberty of a 
brave and loyal people, firmly secured, established, and regulated,  by  laws equally 
advantageous both to the crown and subject. . . . What views  and expectations less 
than these, can a nation reasonably entertain; when it beholds a King firmly settled 
upon the throne of a wisely limited monarchy, whose will, when without limitation, 
showed always a greater love of  justice,  than of  power; and never took pleasure in 
acting otherwise, than according to the most perfect laws of reason and equity?'O 
Although the participants invite us to consider the political setting of  natural 
SOLeibniz-Clarke  Correspondence, pp. 14, 19-20,  7. 202  STEVEN SHAPIN 
philosophical  and metaphysical  disputation,  it  may  be  that such  usages  were 
"merely metaphorical,"  that the references to "kingship"  were figures of speech 
designed  to render  generally  comprehensible messages  that  functioned  solely 
within an autonomous scientific context. This objection can be met by situating 
the actors and their discourse within the relevant political settings, then demon- 
strating how the cultures of  natural philosophy and metaphysics were routinely 
employed to comment upon the social and political orders and to defend concrete 
social interests. 
Political discourse in  England from the 1680s to the 1720s was fundamentally 
structured by the great events of monarchical succession and the attendant debates 
on the nature of royal legitimacy and political obligation. By what right did James 
11, William and Mary, Anne, and George I occupy the throne? What scope did 
they have in the exercise of monarchical power? How did that power relate to the 
rights and liberties of  "people"  and Parliament? What were the duties of  the 
people to the monarch and of the monarch to those he ruled? Abstract political 
writings,  theories of  the  state and  of  obligation,  always bore upon  concrete 
political  events and possible  courses of  practical political  action, such as those 
involved in the Glorious Revolution, the debate on toleration, the Act of Settle- 
ment,  the Triennial  Act,  the  issues  raised  by  the  Sacheverell  trial,  and  the 
relations of church and state. English political thought in this period was thought 
about actual or contemplated  political  action in  respect  of  the distribution  of 
power  in  the  state  and  social  institutions;  and  it  tended  to  focus  upon  the 
questions of  royal legitimacy  and power. The resources  used  to address these 
political  questions included  theology and natural philosophy as well  as direct 
political  comment. As Margaret Jacob and others have shown, the "world  na-
tural"  and the "world  politick"  were connected by a web of religious meaning.s1 
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries the political order was not 
taken to be distinct from the sacred and natural orders. Monarchy stood in some 
relationship to the Deity, even though the precise nature of that relationship was 
violently disputed. Likewise, the natural world was seen to be part of God's order 
and full of  moral significance, although here too there was intense debate over 
how  to conceive God's  role  in  the creation  of  the  world  and  its  continuing 
functioning.  The cultures of  theology,  politics,  and  natural  philosophy  over-
lapped because  they  were connected in  legitimations, justifications,  and criti- 
cisms, especially in the use of conceptions of  God and nature to comment upon 
political order. 
Debates over the scope of monarchical will in particular throw new light on the 
significance of such usages for contemporary natural-philosophical controversies. 
From the Restoration until the accession of  the house of  Hanover English poli- 
tical sentiments were divided among parties (or elements) which often expressed 
different and conflicting views of the role of kingship in the state. One cleavage is 
apparent in  contrasting "Tory"  and "Whig"  ideologies of  political  order.s2  In 
"M. C. Jacob, Newtonians; J. R. Jacob, Robert Boyle. See Shapin, "Social Uses of Science," for a 
discussion of the ideological significance of  these connections. 
s20ne  has to be quite careful not to reify the notion of "political party":  early 18th-century parties 
did not exist in anything like the organizational form of modern parties, and their ideological stances 
often converged on specific issues, even while they continued to represent different "constituencies." 
The best modern sources for parties and their ideologies in this period are: H. T. Dickinson, Liberty 
and Property: Political Ideology in Eighteenth-Century Britain (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977), 
Chs.  1-11;  J. P.  Kenyon, Revolution  Principles:  The Politics  of  Party  1689-1720  (Cambridge: 
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the classic Tory formulation monarchy was properly absolute; the king ruled by 
divine right  and was God's vice-regent; hereditary succession was indefeasible 
and divinely sanctioned; the king's subjects had no right actively to resist his will, 
just  as they had no right to defy God's commands; and subjects had the right to 
passive resistance only when the king had manifestly flouted the laws of God (and 
even then they were obliged to accept the earthly consequences of such defiance). 
The  political alternative to absolute monarchy was, in the classic Tory view, "the 
mob," a concrete example of which could be found in regicide and the Civil War 
decades. Any limits on absolute monarchy or any basis for royal authority less 
than divine led inexorably to chaos. Among the resources Tories invoked in sup- 
port of their ideology of order were scripture, history, and the natural order. The 
relationship between God and the monarch was direct; kings were God's vice- 
regents and ruled by his will. After 1688-  1689 many Tories experienced a crisis 
of conscience; William and Mary were not, in  their eyes, legitimate monarchs, 
divinely ordained and ruling by indefeasible hereditary right. But the alternative 
to them was dangerous, risking further civil war and threats to the rights of the 
landed classes which adhered to Tory ideology. One Tory solution was de facto 
theory, by  which  it  was  acknowledged  that William  and Mary  were  de facto 
rulers, to whom allegiance could be given, without prejudice to James 11's (and 
later "James  111's")  de jure  rights to the throne.s3 Another solution, albeit not 
particular to the Tories, invoked  the notion of  God's  providential  will  in  the 
world to justify  the actual succession and subjects' continuing duty to submit to 
royal commands. God's particular providence and special will accounted for the 
events of  1688- 1689 and justified their outcome. For similar reasons, and through 
the use of similar resources, most Tories supported the 1701 Act of Settlement 
which placed the elector of Hanover in line of succession, although some Tories 
were  indeed plotting the return of  the Stuarts right  up to 1714 and beyond. 
Although they underwent a severe buffeting by the successional convolutions of 
1688 and 1714, Tory principles were adjusted and adapted, in general replacing 
the sovereign and irresistible power of the absolute monarch with that of king and 
Parliament. Like the Vicar of  Bray, most Tories bent their political philosophy 
with the prevailing wind.54  The basic social investments of  men of  substantial 
landed property could only be made secure within a stable and hierarchical social 
order, even if  the particular post-Revolution  version of  stability and hierarchy 
was not precisely to Tories' taste.s5 
Opposed to this was the classic Whig ideology of order, legitimacy, and obliga- 
tion. Absolute monarchy was rejected in principle; monarchical will was properly 
limited by law; succession did not depend upon indefeasible hereditary right but 
upon some sort of  contract with  the political  nation; the relationship between 
God and any particular monarch was not direct but mediated. Most importantly, 
the people (and their parliamentary representatives) had the right to resist the 
commands of  a monarch who threatened to overstep the limits placed upon his 
power. Because William and Mary replaced the absolutist tendencies of James I1 
Tho~lght and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1975),Pt. 111, 
from which the following paragraphs are largely drawn. 
s30nde facto  theory, see esp. Kenyon, Revolution Principles, Ch. 111. 
54"When William our deliverer came,/ To heal the nation's grievance,/ I turned the cat in pan 
again,/ And swore to him allegiance . . .":  The Vicar of  Bray, anonymous 18th-century poem. 
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and because  the  Hanoverians  were  meant  to forestall  the return  of  a Stuart 
backed by the absolutist Louis XIV, the Whigs supported the Glorious Revolu- 
tion and worked to secure the Protestant  succession. Indeed, that was in large 
measure what defined a Whig. Whigs supported a limited version of  monarchy, 
but they also upheld the rights of particular post-Revolution monarchs. Whigs no 
less than Tories wished  that monarchy  should stand as a bulwark  against the 
threat of the mob. For the Whigs were no democrats and even John Locke spoke 
for no more than a very few of  them. They too were men of  property and had 
clear interests in the maintenance of  hierarchy and due submission of ranks. 
A  simple account of  party and ideology  in  this period  would  then point to 
Tories stressing the unlimited will of the monarch and Whigs working towards its 
limitation. However, at least three refinements and modifications of that picture 
have to be introduced to obtain anything like a satisfactory understanding of how 
political philosophies were distributed: first, the ecclesiastical divisions so closely 
connected  to party  politics;  second,  the  interests of  "Court"  and  "Country" 
elements which  cut across Whig and Tory parties; and third, the effects upon 
party  ideology  of  the  fine  structure  of  politics  from  the  Revolution  to  the 
succession of George I. 
Severe strains were put upon the Church of  England by  the 1688 Revolution 
and ensuing events. Traditionally, Anglican divines had offered a religious inter- 
pretation of political obligation; all legitimate authority arose from God's provi- 
dence and all disobedience of rightful authority had the character of  sin.56  But 
after 1688-1689  a significant fraction of  the clergy refused to acknowledge the 
legitimacy  of  William  and Mary  (the nonjurors),  and  many  others felt  their 
principles to be compromised. Moreover, the new order threatened the basis of 
clerical authority in society. Early in William's reign the Toleration Act removed 
much of  the burden on Dissenters and the growing practice of  occasional con- 
formity removed still more. The expiration of the Licensing Act let loose a flood 
of anticlerical and deistical writing, and the diminishing authority of ecclesiastical 
courts eroded the ability of the church to punish the immoral. The church split 
over how to deal with these developments and what posture to adopt towards the 
post-Revolution crown that permitted them. The bishops (constituting the Upper 
House of  Convocation)  tended  towards  latitudinarianism  and  Erastiani~m.~' 
They upheld the legitimacy of the post-Revolution monarchy; supported a large 
measure of toleration; feared Rome more than Dissent; and maintained that the 
church was properly subordinate to state authority. Contrastingly, the parsons 
(who made up the Lower House of Convocation) tended towards a High Church 
philosophy which bemoaned 1688-  1689 as devastating proper principles of non- 
resistance and the jus divinum; abominated occasional conformity and advocated 
a hard line on Dissent and deism; asserted a proper equality of  state and church; 
'('G.  V. Bennett, The Tory Crisis in Church and State 1688-1730:  The Career of Francis Atterbury 
Bishop  of  Rochester  (Oxford: Clarendon Press,  1975), p. 6. See also Bennett,  "Conflict  in  the 
Church,"  in  Geoffrey  Holmes,  ed., Britain  after  the  Glorious  Revolution  1689-1714  (London: 
Macmillan,  1969), pp.  155-175;  Kenyon,  Revolution  Principles,  Chs.  V-VI,  VIII; Stromberg, 
Religious Liberalism, Chs. VII-VIII;  Gerald M. Straka, Anglican Reaction to the Revolution of 1688 
(Madison, Wisc.: State Historical Society, 1962); and Norman Sykes, Church and State in England in 
the XVIllth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1934). 
'G.  R. Cragg, From Puritanism  to the Age of Reason: A Study of  Changes in Religious  Thought 
within  the  Church of  England  1660-1700  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ.  Press,  1950), Chs.  IV, 
VIII-IX;  Stromberg, Religious Liberalism, Ch. IX; Sykes, Church and State, Chs. VII-VIII;  M. C. 
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bridled at the authority of the bishops and rejected their latit~dinarianism.~'  Some 
of  them professed  continuing loyalty to the Stuarts (despite their Catholicism) 
and worked for a reunion with Rome. The party-political significance of these 
ecclesiastical divisions was not lost upon contemporary observers; a 1704 pam- 
phlet put it bluntly: "all  this noise about High and Low Church . . . signifies no 
more than Whig and Tory.  "59 Indeed, High Church principles found their greatest 
support among Tory squires while the Low Church latitudinarian bishops spoke 
for traditional Whig constituencies. The accession of Anne, a good churchwoman, 
raised High Church hopes, but her dislike of faction forced their spokesmen out 
of office, and then High Church agitation developed in opposition to the queen 
and her ministers. Around 1705 the Tory High Churchmen raised the cry of "the 
Church in danger" and in 1709 they rallied around Sacheverell in his rant against 
Dissent, Erastian  tendencies,  and the anti-passive-obedience  ideology  of  the 
Whig bishops. The success of  High Church Tories in mobilizing public support 
badly frightened the Whig bishops, and, from about 1710, their doctrine began to 
converge with  that of  the Tories, particularly in  their endorsement of  passive 
obedience to the monarch.60 
Ecclesiastical conflicts between High and Low Church orientations helped to 
polarize divisions between Court and Country par tie^.^'  Particularly after 1689 
and the commencement of William's  wars with France, the political nation was 
divided on the questions of what the financial, military, and patronage powers of 
the crown ought to be. The increased size of  the army and the mobilization of 
resources to finance it vastly augmented court patronage. Within both Whig and 
Tory parties there were elements which either supported the prerogatives of court 
power or wished to see that power strictly limited. Junto Whigs as well as Tory 
ministers  under William  and Anne worked  to persuade parliamentarians that 
their  particular  interests depended upon  giving  support  for the power  of  the 
crown and its ministers.  In both Whig and Tory parties there were many who 
realized that their goals could only be furthered by maintaining influence at court 
and by  advocating greater scope for monarchical power. Tory elements were 
historically disposed to support royal prerogatives, even if  many of  them ques- 
tioned the legitimacy of William and Anne. Whig elements, while traditionally 
disinclined to celebrate monarchical will,  nevertheless perceived the success of 
William's  and Anne's Continental wars as vital to the security of  a Protestant 
limited monarchy in opposition to Louis XIV's Papist absolutism. It was largely 
for this reason that the Whig Low Church bishops tended to have close ties with 
the court and to support its powers. 
5XFor  a  fascinating  account  of  High  Church  natural  philosophy  see C. B.  Wilde,  "Hutchin-
sonianism, Natural Philosophy and Religious Controversy in Eighteenth Century Britain," History of 
Science,  1980, 18:1-24. 
5yALetter to a Friend  concerning the New Distinction of  High  and  Low Church (London, 1704), 
p. 19, quoted in S. L. Ollard, ed., A Dictionary of English Church History (London: A. R. Mowbray 
& Co., 1912), p.  115 (Ollard provides  satisfactory short definitions and histories of  ecclesiastical 
terminology). 
60Kenyon,Revolution Principles, pp. 202-203;  Geoffrey Holmes, The Trial of Doctor Sacheverell 
(London: Eyre Methuen, 1973). 
6'As  with Whig and Tory, it is best not to think of Court and Country as modern political parties, 
even  though  they  were generally  called  "parties"  by  contemporaries. For accounts of  Court and 
Country divisions see Dickinson, Liberty and Property, Chs. 111-V;  Pocock, Machiavellian Moment, 
Ch. XII; Geoffrey Holmes, British  Politics  in  the Age of  Anne (London: Macmillan,  1967): J. R. 
Jones, Country and  Court: England,  1658-1714  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press,  1978); 
W. A. Speck, Stability and Strife: England  1714-1760  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1979). 206  STEVEN SHAPIN 
Similarly, Country elements were found in both parties. Country Tories were 
traditionally procrown, but, as we have seen, had ideological problems accepting 
the legitimacy of  post-Revolution monarchs. In ecclesiastical matters Country 
Tories tended to support the High Churchmen in their fight against the Erastian 
subordination of church to court. Many Country ("Old"  or "Real")  Whigs found 
it  difficult  after the Glorious  Revolution  to adjust themselves  to a  toadying 
posture; some were in  a position where it was  inexpedient to do so. Country 
ideology expressed itself in a variety of ways: paramount was a social vision of  a 
community of virtue composed of  freeholding  landowner^.^^  Country ideology 
held that court and ministerial influence over Commons was corrupting; it dis- 
liked  the  idea  of  a  standing  army  and  advocated  a  militia  of  independent 
landowners; it  was  deeply  suspicious  of  placemen  and courtiers,  especially  in 
financial and commercial circles and in the military. 
Some modifications of ideological patterns were occasioned by particular poli- 
tical circumstances from the Revolution to the succession. Of special importance 
was the pressure exerted on Whigs to clarify what had happened in 1688. Estab- 
lishment Whigs intended 1688 to be the last revolution, hence there were obvious 
dangers in saying that James I1 had been rightly deposed and that the monarch 
ruled by consent of the sovereign people. Excessive stress upon the consent of the 
people ran  the very  real  risk  of  providing  a  justification  for  another Stuart 
restoration. Emphasis upon Anne's hereditary right to the throne ran the same 
risk, for  this could be construed as endorsing the Pretender's claims. Hence Court 
Whigs tended to opt for the theory either that James I1 had abdicated or that the 
Revolution was the working out of God's providential will, or some combination 
of these theories. Only the Old Whigs of the Country party were prepared fully to 
endorse the "Revolution  Principle"  of  popular sovereignty. Political pressures 
pushing Court Whigs in  the direction of  positions which  had been traditionally 
Tory became particularly  intense by  1708-1711.  For one thing Anne's  rapid 
aging made it a matter of urgency that Whigs expeditiously settle their principles 
of legitimacy and obligation. And from the right came Tory attempts to associate 
all Whigs with the political views of  the Country element, accusing Whigs as a 
whole of republican and leveling tendencies. 
The thunder from the right was  even more intense in  ecclesiastical matters. 
High Church tactics portrayed  the Whigs  as lacking appropriate bloodlust for 
hunting heretics, and even discovered the occasional deistical red under the Whig 
bed. This was a problem which afflicted Newtonian divines particularly acutely 
from about 1711. In that year a controversy began to rage over the Arianism of 
Newton's Cambridge successor William Whiston, and Newton's own speculations 
on Biblical chronology were raising doubts about the great man's orth~doxy.~~ 
But these difficulties for the Newtonian establishment were slight compared to 
6'This  vision derived from the political writings of James Harrington, which John Toland edited in 
1699 under the Earl of  Shaftesbury's patronage; see J. G. A. Pocock, ed., The Political  Works of 
James Harrington  (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), esp. pp. 141-143;  Pocock, "Machia- 
velli, Harrington and English Political Ideologies in the Eighteenth Century," Politics, Language and 
Time: Essays  on Political  Thought and  History  (London: Methuen,  1972), pp.  104-147;  Lois  G. 
Schwoerer, "No Standing Armies!":  The Antiarmy Ideology in Seventeenth-Century England  (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1974), Chs. VIII-IX. 
h3Redwood,Reason, Ridicule and Religion,  pp. 98, 165- 167; note that Leibniz was one of those 
who publicly discerned atheistical implications in Newton's chronological work. For English Arianism 
in this period, see Stromberg, Religious Liberalism,  Ch. IV. 207  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
those that embroiled Samuel Clarke from 1712 to 1714. Clarke's Scripture Doc- 
trine of  the Trinity (1712) was seized upon by the High Church party in Convoca- 
tion  for its  apparent  support  of  Arianism,  and,  after a  heated  exchange of 
pamphlets, its author was censured by  the Lower House in 1714.h4  After that 
experience, which severely damaged his chances of  advancement in the church, 
Clarke was especially keen to restore his own reputation for theological ortho- 
doxy as well  as that of  Newtonianism in general. The power and popularity of 
High  Church Tories were  demonstrated  during  the Sacheverell trial  and the 
ensuing elections. Low Church Whigs were put on their guard. In their apologetic 
writings  references to kings  as God's  vice-regents  and to the political  role of 
God's providential will became increasingly frequent, as the gap separating Whig 
conceptual resources from those of Tories narrowed. Thus Court Whig political 
philosophy moved in a generally conservative direction from about 1710 to 1714. 
Nevertheless,  between  1689 and 1714 the nation was almost constantly at war 
with Papist absolutist forces and the succession was uncertain. As Kenyon notes, 
"it was only sensible for the Whigs to try to broaden the basis of their support, to 
represent themselves as a party of  'the people."'  However, with the Treaty of 
Utrecht in 1713, the accession of the thoroughly Whig George I in 1714, and the 
discrediting  of  the Tories by  the 1715 Jacobite  rebellion, the pressure  on the 
Whigs relaxed  "and  the establishmentarian,  elitist tendencies in whiggery . . . 
gained complete a~cendancy."~~  After 1714 Whig toadying to the court was very 
likely to be rewarded. Establishment Whigs developed, in Dickinson's words, "a 
conservative political ideology which  laid as much or even more emphasis on 
authority and obedience as it did on liberty and the rights of  subjects. . . . Now 
that they were firmly established in power the establishment Whigs required a 
political ideology which would persuade subjects to accept as legitimate their own 
exercise of  authority. In other words, the Court Whigs no longer required  an 
ideology designed to oppose those in power, but an ideology which would defend 
and justify the status quo.  "hh The Vicar of Bray, it would seem, caricatured Whigs 
as much as Tories.(" 
NEWTONIANISM AND THE COURT WHIG IDEOLOGY OF ORDER 
Where did the Newtonians, and where did their disloyal opposition, fit into the 
array of  political allegiances  in  late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century 
England? Leibniz himself had certain ideas on this subject. In 1713 he wrote to 
Johann Bernoulli in reference to his treatment in the Commercium epistolicum: 
I understand that in England there are learned men who do  not approve this procedure 
which is an affront to all grave and good men. And your guess just about hits the nail 
on  the head, that is, that those who have little love for the House of Hanover have also 
"Samuel  Clarke, The Scripture Doctrine of  the Trinity, in Works, Vol. IV, pp. 1-222;  the rest of 
this volume contains Clarke's  replies to his High Church critics and an account of  proceedings in 
Convocation. Clarke undertook not to write any more about the Trinity and to submit himself to 
censure. 
65Kenyon, Revolution Principles,  p. 203. 
'"Dickinson,  Liberty and Property, p. 126. On the partial convergence of Whig and Tory ideology 
during this period, see also Stromberg. Religious  Liberalism, Ch. IX. 
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meant to wound me; for an English friend writes to me that it seems to some that 
certain persons have acted not as mathematicians and Fellows of the Royal Society 
against a Fellow, but as Tories against a Whig. 
A week later Leibniz rehearsed his theory to a Scottish acquaintance, injecting a 
note of puzzlement regarding Newton's own affiliations and behavior: 
What you tell me, sir, is so comical it seems that my advisaries in the Royal Society 
have  lately written against me as if  I were a Whig rather than a member of  their 
Society. I had believed that M. Newton was somewhat allied with the Whigs; thus I 
would not have imagined that the spirit of faction would go so far as to spread even 
into the mathematical  science^.^" 
Leibniz was correct to pull back from the charge that Newton and his friends 
were Tories. As Hall and Tilling remark, "If Leibniz was attributing Jacobitism to 
Newton  and his  friends,  he  could  hardly  have  been  further from  the mark. 
Newton had been an opponent of James 11, and his whole political life had been in 
the Whig intere~t."~'  That Leibniz could have mistaken the behavior of Newton 
and his associates for that of Tories is understandable, both in the context of the 
calculus disputes and in  the later conflicts of  1715-1716.  For the Newtonians 
were largely Court Whigs, and, as we have seen, Court Whigs and Tories came to 
share certain philosophical resources in the early eighteenth century. 
It has already been noted that both Newton and Clarke were placemen, owing 
their position and advancement to the patronage of the crown and its ministers. 
Apologetic propagators of Newtonian natural philosophy and natural religion in 
the Boyle lectures shared Newton's Whiggism, and, like Newton himself, most 
of  them came from the classic constituencies of  the Court element in  English 
politics: either as recipients of  crown favor or as adherents of  the latitudinarian 
Low Church faction: Bentley was a royal chaplain (to William), as were Clarke 
(to Princess Caroline and Queen Anne), Ibbot (Clarke's assistant at St. James's, 
Westminster, and chaplain to George I), and Derham (chaplain to the Prince of 
Wales, later George 11). Bentley's  great patron was  the latitudinarian  Bishop 
Stillingfleet, and John Harris's was the Whig Lord Chancellor William Cowper. 
Bentley was Keeper of the Royal Libraries and later Master of Trinity, where he 
served the Whig and Low Church interest (and, more spectacularly, his own). 
Among other Newtonian apologists, John Keill held crown office under Anne as 
Treasurer of the Palatines and, from about 1711, as "decypherer"  to the Queen. 
Part of  the behavior of  Newtonian divines can be understood by pointing to 
their interests as clerics; part, however, has to be referred to the circumstances of 
the latitudinarian  Low Church faction to which  they  belonged.  The cry  "the 
Church in danger" was raised by Tory High Churchmen, but it was expedient at 
times, especially under Anne, for Low Churchmen to display their vigor in pur- 
suing the sources of that "danger."  Moreover, no Anglican cleric, however Low, 
needed much prompting from "High-flyers"  to defend the church from the free- 
thinking deists: Blount, Collins, Tindal, and Toland. It has to be understood that 
the freethinkers' assault was directed both at a certain conception of the nature of 
68Leibniz  to Bernoulli, 8 Aug. 1713, in Correspondence of Newton, Vol. VI, pp. 21-22;  Leibniz to 
Thomas Burnet, 23 Aug. 1713, in Manuel, Portrait of Isaac Newton, p. 332, and Hall, Philosophers at 
War, p. 166. On Burnet as a source of Leibniz's political perceptions of England see Nicholas Jolley, 
"Leibniz  on Locke and Socinianism," J. Hist. Ideas, 1978, 39:233-250. 
h9Correspondence  of Newton, Vol. VI, p. 23n.; also Vol. V, pp. xxii-xxiv. 209  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
religion and the role of  the church, on the one hand, and at a specific notion of 
the crown and its authority, on the other. This was a natural tendency insofar as 
the political order was still justified in religious terms. Before the Revolution the 
church had been far more united in its support of  the crown than it was after- 
wards. The High Church faction contained many who denied divine legitimacy to 
William and Anne, while advocating divine right monarchy as a general principle. 
In many respects the High Church lower clergy were at war with the monarchy, 
while the Low Church bishops upheld its rights and powers and looked to it for 
support. It is useful, therefore, to treat the great conflicts of  about 1691-1720 
between  latitudinarian Anglican Newtonians  and freethinkers  as disputes be- 
tween  elements of  Whiggism:  between  radical  Country Whigs  (or "Common- 
wealthmen")  and latitudinarian Court Whigs. 
In his  Christianity Nor  Mysterious of  1696 John Toland attacked the role of 
revelation in Christian religion. In later amplifications of  1701 and 1702 Toland 
joined his views of  the proper nature of  Christianity to a wide-ranging attack on 
the Court element. While  owning himself  to be a member of  the Established 
Church, Toland did not approve of  its monopolistic powers: 
. . . I do not think it a Doctrin of this Church to persecute or disturb those of another 
Religion which  dos not teach or practice  any Thing that's  cruel, immoral, or pro- 
fane. . . . [Where there is  no Liberty of  Conscience there can be no civil liberty, 
. . . no possibility of Men's freely informing themselves concerning the true Religion, 
nor any Refuge or Protection  for the Distrest, which  is  the greatest Glory of  free 
government^.'^ 
Toland opposed arbitrary power both in religion and in politics: ".  . . I am a great 
Common-wealthsman, the truth whereof I freely own . . ."; "I  have always bin, 
now am, and ever shall be persuaded that all Sorts of Magistrats are made for and 
by the People, and not the People for or by  the Magistrats. . . .""  He vehe- 
mently attacked absolute monarchy and the arbitrary power of  king and court, 
especially when subject to "the Influence of Favorits; the Mischiefs of evil Coun- 
sillors; the Vanity, Lewdness, Flattery, Violence, Fraud, Venality, Bribery, and 
Rapine of  the servil and mercenary Courtiers. . . ." Arbitrary power is all the 
worse when the king "has religion prepar'd to justify, and Force to maintain him 
in whatsoever he dos, all his Subjects entirely depending on his pleasure. . . ." 
While Toland sanctioned the legitimacy of William and Mary, he did so on classic 
Old Whig principles: "no King can ever be so good as one of  [the people's] own 
making; as there is no Title equal to their Approbation, which is the only divine 
Right of all Magistracy, for the Voice of the People is the Voice of  God."" 
As  we have already seen, the conflict between freethinking deists and Anglican 
Newtonian  apologists  involved  natural-philosophical  and  metaphysical  issues 
similar to those which figured centrally in the Leibniz-Clarke disputes. We can 
70 John Toland, Anglia Libera: or the Limitation and Succession of the Crown of England Explained 
and  Asserted. . . (London, 1701), pp. 99-100;  this book was written  "to  acquaint  the House of 
Hanover with the true Nature of their Title":  ibid., Sig. A6T. 
"John  Toland,  Vindicius Liberius: or, M. Toland's Defence of  Himself  against the Late Lower 
House of Convocation . . . and a Justification of the Whigs and  Commonwealthmen against the Mis- 
representations  of  all their Opposers (London, 1702), pp. 125- 126. 
7'Toland,  Anglia  Libera,  pp. 9,  11, 26  (italics in  original);  in  1709 an aggressively  Real Whig 
pamphlet was entitled Vox Populi Vox  Dei, eliciting the High Church riposte The Voice of the People 
No Voice of  God, see Kenyon, Revolution Principles, pp. 123-125. 210  STEVEN SHAPIN 
now see that such cultural controversies were embedded within a structure of 
conflict over the proper order of  society. The views of  freethinking Common- 
wealthmen posed  a threat to the material  interests of  Court Whig divines. A 
response was therefore demanded, and that response fit the scope of the interests 
at stake: it was immediate and massive. In composing their replies to the radical 
freethinkers,  the Newtonians  were  rehearsing  the  major  themes  of  Clarke's 
replies to Leibniz. 
PHILOSOPHICAL RESOURCES OF POLITICAL COMMENT 

AMONG ANGLICAN NEWTONIANS 

In the period preceding the 1715- 1716 disputes with Leibniz latitudinarian Court 
Whigs like Samuel Clarke were faced with a set of interrelated political problems. 
How to buttress  the sort of  moral  and social order which  acknowledged  the 
spiritual superintendence of the clergy in general? How to put maximum practical 
political distance between themselves and the deistical and heretical tendencies 
with  which  their High Church  opponents were  attempting  to associate  them? 
How best to celebrate the powers of the king and court upon which their security 
and preferment depended? In coping with each of  these problems they invoked 
the natural-philosophical and metaphysical resources which came to form the core 
of  the Leibniz-Clarke exchanges. Most significantly, the Newtonian apologists 
invoked the notion of  God's supreme will  and the attendant liberty  of  moral 
agents. 
In his Boyle lectures Clarke linked the action of  God's free will in nature to 
mankind's free moral choice: 
. . . God, by  Creating things, manifests it to be his Will, that things should  be what 
they Are. And as Providence wonderfully preserves things in their present State; all 
necessary  Agents,  by  constantly  and  regularly  obeying the Laws  of  their Nature, 
necessarily employ all their Natural Powers in promoting the same end; so 'tis evident 
it cannot but be the Will of God,  that all rational Creatures, whom he has indued with 
those singular Powers and  Faculties,  of  Understanding,  Liberty and Free-Choice, 
whereby they are exalted in  Dignity above the rest of  the World; should likewise 
imploy those their extraordinary Faculties in preserving the Order and Harmony of the 
Creation, and not in introducing Disorder and Conf~lsion therein." 
If  God does not have free will, then man surely cannot either. And if  either God 
or man is  a necessary being,  then it would be meaningless to speak of  moral 
accountability. To threaten the notion of  the moral accountability of  individual 
men for their individual actions would be to erode the moral basis of proper social 
order. 
At the root of this threat was the contention that matter might think or contain 
principles of self-action within itself. Only if  matter were inanimate, brute, and 
stupid would God's will be necessary to set it into motion, sustain it in motion, 
and produce the phenomena of  sentience. Only if  matter and spirit were con- 
ceived separate and distinct could the immortality of  the soul be asserted and the 
afterlife be used  as a sanction on man's mundane moral conduct. And only if 
matter were inanimate could free will be unambiguously attributed to God and 
man.  Hence,  no  Newtonian  apologist  omitted to attack freethinkers'  matter 
theory and to identify its pernicious moral consequences. If  matter and motion 
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sufficed to explain sentience, then, as Clarke wrote, "every  Thought in a Man's 
Mind must likewise be necessary, and depending wholly upon external Causes; 
And  there  could  be  no  such  thing  in  Us,  as  Liberty,  or a  Power  of  Self- 
determination.  Now  what  Ends and Purposes of  Religion,  mere Clocks  and 
Watches  are capable of  serving  needs  no  long  and nice  c~nsideration."'~  A 
hylozoist matter theory would erode the whole system of  obligations and sanc- 
tions that kept a hierarchical social order in place. If  views of  an afterlife were 
discarded, then what difference did morality make in this life? And if  morality 
lost its bite, then what faith could be accordkd contracts, promises, and commit- 
ments? Thus Harris recognized  that  the deists'  corporeal and necessary  God 
"makes  Him nothing  at all but Nature,  and deprives both Him and us of  the 
Noble Principle of Freedom of Will: and then they know that there can be no such 
things as Rewards and Punishments, . . . and consequently that they may do any 
thing that they have a mind to."75  Ibbot linked the idea that "Matter is endu'd with 
a Power of Thought, and a Principle of Self-motion" to the mortality of the soul; 
if  the soul were mortal, then "there  is no account to be given of  our present 
Carriage and Behaviour,  nor any  future State of  Rewards  or Punishments." 
~n~one who believed that, whatever he called himself, was a practical atheist and 
could not faithfully enter into "Bargains  and Contracts, Oaths and  promise^."'^ 
Bentley saw the system of deference in society at risk from hylozoism; the "Sect of 
Free-thinkers"  he styled  "a  Commonwealth of  Savages, where nobody governs 
nor nobody obeys." Necessitarianism justified self-interested arrogance; as Bent- 
ley told George I in a sermon, "no one . . . that lives in society . . . can be said to 
live to himself. No, he lives to his prince and his country." Ibbot feared that the 
thrust of deism was to "exempt Men . . . from a due Submission and Obedience 
to their lawful Superiors and Governours, whether in  Church or State."  And 
John Hancock saw hylozoist necessitarianism  as a double-edged sword: as such 
"Principles  encourage Princes to oppress their Subjects, so they set subjects at 
liberty to disturb their Governours."" 
A spiritually governed moral order was thus seen to depend upon human and 
divine liberty; these in turn depended upon insensible and inanimate matter. The 
doctrine of fate and necessity contravened these requirements and was seen as the 
strategy  of groups who wished  to dissolve proper patterns  of  deference  and 
~bligation.'~ God's supreme will had to have a role in a justly constituted natural 
philosophy. How, then, to reconcile God's volitional providence with the concept 
of  second causes?  If  this  reconciliation could  not be  effected,  then a theistic 
religion would be seen to be at odds with natural philosophy:  a state of  affairs 
rejected  by  all  Anglican  Newtonians.  Of  "all  the  variable  Events,"  Clarke 
preached, 
74Samuel  Clarke, A  Third and  Fourth Defense of  [His Letter] to Mr.  Dodwel  (2nd ed., London, 
1712), p. 59; quoted in John H. Gay, "Matter and Freedom in the Thought of  Samuel Clarke,"  J. 
Hist.  Ideas,  1963, 24:85-105,  the best source for Clarke's views on human liberty. 
75Harris,Atheistical  Objections, Sermons IV-V,  p. 49; see also Clarke, Remarks upon a Book, 
pp. 41-42,  44-45;  Gay, "Matter and Freedom," pp. 88-90. 
7hIbbot,Course of Sermons, Pt. 11, pp. 9,75;  also on this point see Redwood, Reason, Ridicule and 
Religion,  pp.  106-114.  For the background of  freethinkers' hylozoism in  17th-century mortalism: 
Christopher Hill, Milton  and  the English Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979), Ch. XXV. 
77Bentley,Remarks upon a Late Discourse, p. 300; Richard Bentley, "A Sermon Preached Before 
King George I. On February the third, 1716-7,"  in Works, Vol. 111, pp. 263-277,  on p. 268; Ibbot, 
Course of Sermons, Pt. 11, p. 11; Hancock, Arguments to Prove the Being of  God, p. 254. 
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that happen  in  the Universe, there is  and can be in Nature no other proper  and 
efficient Cause; but only the Free Will of rational and intelligent Creatures . . . and the 
Suprenze  Power  of  God, directing  by  his  omnipresent Providence,  (according  to 
certain Wise Laws or  Rules, established by, and entirely depending upon his own good 
pleasure,) the inanimate Motions of the whole material and unintelligent World. 
It was only the enemy of true religion who used the findings of natural philosophy 
as arguments against Christian theism: 
Ridiculous therefore is the Arguing of the Infidel and Irreligious; who presently thinks 
himself  secure of  excluding the Providence of God, if  he can show a Thing to be 
brought about by  Narural  Causes. .  .  .  For what  are Narural  Causes? Nothing  but 
those Laws and Powers, which God of his own good  lea sure has im~lanted  in  the 
several parts of Matter, in  order to make them Gstruhents of fulfilling his supreme 
These laws  God appoints and continuously  sustains: God's will  in  nature acts 
constantly and is not constrained by laws."  It is evident therefore that Newtonian 
Anglicans had been engaged for some time in efforts to secure the moral order of 
society (and the moral authority of the clergy) from threats posed by freethinking 
deists whose strategy it was to deny both divine and human free will. 
Newtonian Anglicans also deployed philosophical resources to comment upon 
the proper scope of monarchical will. Of particular interest in this connection is 
the variation between the celebration of  unrestricted will found in the Leibniz- 
Clarke exchanges and earlier statements found in  Clarke's  sermons preached 
before the queen. It was by no means the natural position of any element in the 
Whig party, even of Court Whigs, to assert the absolute supremacy of the royal 
will.  Speaking in  overtly political contexts, Court Whig apologists like Clarke 
more commonly conjoined a proper exercise of will to the dictates of reason or 
law, or they even erected unaccustomed distinctions between the characteristics 
of God and those of kings. God cozlld act howsoever he wished, but it would be a 
contradiction of his benevolent nature to act against the principle of what is good 
and what is reasonable. To say this, however, was not to restrict the absolute 
power of  God's will,  or so Clarke insisted. The requirements of  one apologetic 
context  sometimes seemed  to conflict  with  those  of  another,  and  there  are 
passages in Clarke's sermons where the tension may be discerned. No restrictions 
could be accepted upon the divine will, yet any Whig had to place some limita- 
tions upon the exercise  of  will by God's vice-regents. Thus Clarke labored to 
reconcile cosmic Toryism with mundane Whiggism: 
These are lively descriptions of arbitrary Power indeed; arbitrary, not in the Sense that 
the Tyrlrnts of This World have occasioned that word to be used, when it signifies a 
Power of doing unreasonable and unjust things, a Power of Violence and unrighteous 
oppression, a Power of acting according to mere Will and Pleasure without Right or 
Reason; but in God, arbitrary or irresistible Power, tho' it is indeed a Power of doing 
all things absolutely without controul, yet it is so a Power of doing them, as that at the 
"Clarke,  "The Event of Things not always Answerable to Second Causes," in Sermons, Vol. VI, 
pp. 187-201,  on pp. 193-  194, 196. 
'"See,  e.g., Maxwell,  "A  Summary  of  the  Controversy,"  p.  61; see  similar  views  of  God's 
sustenance in Clarke, Obligations  of  Natural Religion,  p. 600; Clarke, "Of  the Omnipresence  of 
God," in Works, Vol. I, pp. 46-52,  on p. 48; Cheyne, Philosophical Principles of Natural Religion, 
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same time there is always with the notion of  That Power, necessarily and inseparably 
connected, an Idea of  infinite Reason, Wisdom, and Goodness. . . . For in  God, Will 
and Reason are one and the same thing . .  . ;whereas in the Rulers of  this World, they 
too  often  signify  things  contrary to  each  other:  Governing  according to  Law  or 
Reason, and governing according to absolure Will or Pleasure, being on Earth the two 
most opposite forms of  G~vernment.~' 
Arbitrary power in men is to be "detested,  dreaded, and abhorred," whereas in 
God it  is  the "great  Principle and Foundation of  all Religion."  In a sermon 
preached before the queen in 1705 Clarke managed both to characterize princes 
as God's delegates and to remind her of classic Whig principles: 
And  here  is  the  true  and  immortal Glory  of  wise  and  good  Princes, that  as  they 
represent God in the Exercise of  Power and Authority in the World, so they resemble 
him also in the Application of  that Power to serve the Ends of  Virtue and Goodness in 
promoting the publick Happiness of  Mankind. . . . Those whom  [God] has endued 
with  Power  and  Authority  to  represent  him  on  Earth, are  then  most  truly  and 
illustriously his Vice-gerents, when they look upon a large Extent of  Power, to be only 
a Greater  Compass of  doing good; when  they  imitate God, in  being  Lovers and 
Preservers of  Mankind, and making Government a Protection and Security to all that 
live under it.x' 
The concrete political circumstances over which Whiggery had triumphed were 
too recent and vivid  for any Whig to trifle with  absolutism. Under the rule of 
James 11,  according to Clarke, it pleased  "God  to threaten us with the Rod of 
arbitrary Power,  and with  the  fears  of  Popish  Slavery";  the Duke of  Marl- 
borough's  victory over the French at Mons was counted as God's providential 
interposition, saving England from Rome and absolutist tyrann~.~'  There was no 
sense in which  Court Whig or Low Church interests could be served by  cele- 
brating the sort of sovereign will manifested in the reign of the last Stuart or  of the 
Sun King.  Likewise  there was  no sense  in  which  latitudinarian  Court Whig 
interests could be served by subsuming their philosophy of will to that of radical 
Country Whigs like John Toland. Differences in Court Whig apologists' accounts 
of sovereign will can be referred to the different, and historically changing, con- 
texts in which the accounts appeared. Clarke's efforts to ingratiate his Low Church 
faction with the High Church-leaning  queen manifest themselves, for example, 
in a deferential sermon of 1705. Clarke assured Anne that proper religion taught 
subjects what were their duties towards those whom God's will has set over them: 
"willing  and cheerful Obedience to [their commands]: In delighting to promote 
their Honour, and to increase amongst Men that Duty and Respect, which is due 
to Authority: In thinking them that rule well, worthy of double Honour . . . [and 
in1 a careful and diligent and conscientious Discharge of our several Duties, each 
in our respective Stations. . . ."X4 
8'Samuel Clarke, "Of  the Omnipotence of  God," in Works, Vol.  I, pp. 53-65,  on pp. 54-55; 
compare Clarke, "Of  the Liberty of Moral Agents," in Sermons, Vol. IV, pp. 1-  17, esp. p. 12. The 
dating and setting of the quoted sermon is not known, but there are indications that it is from about 
the time of the 1704-  1705 Boyle lectures and may have been preached before the queen. 
X'Samuel Clarke, "Sermon Preach'd before the Queen . . . on Sunday, December the 30th, 1705," 
in  Sermons, Vol. XI,  pp.  1-21,  on  pp.  17-18;  compare Clarke, "Sermon  Preach'd  before  the 
Queen . . . 8th of March, 1709-  10," in ibid.,pp. 65-83. 
X3Samuel  Clarke, "Sermon  Preach'd  before the Honourable House of  Commons . . . November 
22,  1709," in ibid.,pp. 41-63,  on p. 42. 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Historians of ideas like their subjects to be consistent. Inconsistency is viewed as 
a mark upon a thinker's intellectual stature, and historians often labor to show 
that the apparent inconsistency of highly regarded figures is really a manifestation 
of some deep-seated psychological or methodological consistency. An alternative 
approach is to assess utterances in their contexts of  use, recognizing that ideas 
may be multifunctional and that the pertinent historical circumstances affecting 
their uses may be complex and changing. Variations in Court Whig accounts of 
sovereign will are best taken as signs of the highly political nature of such con- 
ceptions and of the complexly shifting settings in which they were produced. In 
reminding the monarch of classic Whig political principles apologists like Clarke 
stressed lawful limitations upon royal will and produced appropriate accounts of 
divine will and wisdom. Elsewhere, Court Whigs were concerned to defend their 
interests and notions of order from radical Country Whig assaults, and here they 
were far more inclined to remove practical limits upon sovereign will. This is one 
of  our best  clues  to the political  connections between  the Newtonians'  fight 
against freethinking deists and the campaign of 1715-  1716 against Leibniz. Cos- 
mological similarities between Leibniz's philosophy and that of the English free- 
thinkers may be discerned in the relevant texts, but the best indication that such 
similarities were historically  significant lies in the fact that they elicited similar 
responses from Newtonian apologists. English deism, to be sure, was regarded as 
a serious threat, but that danger was made more formidable by the possibility that 
the Hanoverian succession would bring Leibniz to England where his philosophy 
might  gain  court countenance and provide  useful  resources to the Common- 
wealthmen. 
It bears repeating that the perceived political uses of Leibniz's philosophy of 
God and nature in England have no necessary relationship to Leibniz's intentions 
or to the interests which might have sustained his views on the Continent. Leibniz 
was not a player in the English political game, although part of the significance of 
his philosophy in England arose from the sense that he might become a leading 
player at any moment. There is no evidence that Leibniz's philosophy, however 
many similarities were perceived between it and the ideas of Collins, Toland, and 
their like, was developed with a view to sustaining Country Whig conceptions of 
political order. There is thus no necessity to inquire here into possible political 
uses of Leibnizian thought across the Channel.x' 
Since the argument of this paper has been rather complex, it is best to conclude 
by reviewing its basic structure and drawing out several of its implications. We 
started by identifying  a well-known  intellectual controversy  between two indi- 
vidual philosophers.  We then showed that the philosophical resources each of 
them employed had a history of uses by antagonistic social groups in England. 
Natural-philosophical and metaphysical conceptions were routinely employed to 
comment upon political order, and those conceptions involved in the Leibniz- 
8SIntriguing  materials  for  such  a project  are to be  found in  Leroy  E. Loemker, Struggle for 
Synthesis: The Seventeenth Century Background  of  Leibniz's Synthesis of  Order and Freedom (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1972), Jon Elster, Leibniz et la formation  de I'esprit capitaliste 
(Paris:  Aubier  Montaigne,  1975), and  esp.  R. W. Meyer,  Leibnitz  and  the  Seventeenth-Century 
Revolution,  trans.  J. P. Stern (Cambridge: Bowes & Bowes,  1952). Meyer explores the relations 
between  Leibniz's  monadological  theory  of  matter  and  his  search  for  a harmony  of  European 
interests suitable to withstand the absolutist will of Louis XIV. 215  THE LEIBNIZ-CLARKE DISPUTES 
Clarke  exchanges  were  of  major significance  in  the political  and  apologetic 
writings of that period. Having shown that conflicting conceptions of political and 
moral order were sustained by the invocation of diverging notions of divine and 
natural order, we could see how important social interests were at stake in the 
intellectual disputes in question. The evaluations of Leibniz's philosophy by the 
Newtonians followed the patterns established in the history of apologetic uses of 
similar  resources  by  English  freethinkers; that  congruence  supports the con-
clusion  that  such  uses  were  an  important  basis  for  judgments  of  natural-
philosophical claims in the period. Considerations of  social use did not follow 
autonomous processes of  evaluation but were in fact central to natural philoso- 
phers' judgments. 
This paper therefore is based upon a post-Koyrean historiographic sensibility. 
It has shown that late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century conceptions of 
God's attributes and his role in nature functioned in overtly political as well as 
natural-philosophical  and theological  settings. Since these settings overlapped 
significantly, this paper set out to take the overlaps seriously and to see how they 
were constructed through processes of use in context and what consequences such 
uses had for the career of natural philosophy. For some time now explorations of 
the overlaps between  natural philosophy  and religion  have been routine and 
uncontentious: a state of affairs we owe to the boundary-breaking work of Koyre 
and  his  followers.  To recognize  the  significance  of  political  uses  of  natural 
philosophy  and  natural  religion  is  to extend  and  develop  Koyre's  historical 
sensibilities in the direction they now seem best suited to go. You have printed the following article:
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